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DOWN STEP BY STEP—RATIFICATION OF




A sporadic series of opinions dating back seven decades has incre-
mentally established that, in Texas, the executive has no authority to pool
the royalty or nonexecutive mineral interest covered by an oil and gas lease.
Conversely, the owners of nonexecutive interests do have a choice whether
or not to ratify leases that purport to cover their interest. This state of the
law arose first from cases involving royalty apportionment and community
leases, then drawing in nonexecutive interests, before finally establishing
the privileged position of freestanding royalty and nonexecutive mineral
interests. Texas should instead follow the lead of Louisiana and West Vir-
ginia and again recognize the executive position the lessor has vis-à-vis
nonexecutive interests. So long as the duty of the executive to associated
nonexecutive interests is observed, leasing executives should be able to bind
those nonexecutives to all the terms of a lease, including pooling and entire-
ties clauses. Thereafter, a lessee should be able to voluntarily pool those
interests provided it does so as a reasonably prudent operator. As recent
litigation shows, this change would prevent situations in which small
nonexecutive interests far from production make payment claims based on
dubious title assertions. It would also promote the state’s policy of fostering
mineral development and ease title examination burdens related to the or-
derly development of leases. Within the existing jurisprudence, when a free-
standing royalty owner files lease ratifications in the public record or is
judicially determined to have ratified a lease, it should be subject to every
term in the lease. This includes provisions to apportion royalties on a tract-
specific basis rather than across the entire lease. Such ratifications should
not be revocable. Several defensive measures, such as drafting carefully to
limit lease coverage, getting ratifications before development, and using al-
location wells, may help lessees in certain, but not all, instances.
* Director and Professor, Harry L. Reed Oil & Gas Law Institute, South Texas Col-
lege of Law Houston, B.S. (Geology) and M.S. (Geophysics), Wright State University;
Ph.D., Texas A&M University (Petroleum Seismology); J.D., University of Oklahoma. Li-
censed in Texas and New Mexico. The author thanks Keith Ammann, Owen Anderson,
Austin Brister, Chris Halgren, John Lowe, David Pierce, and Randall Sadler for their assis-
tance in completing this project. Portions of this article detailing some case law background
appear in JOHN LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW (7th ed.
2018). This article is dedicated to the memory of Haynes and Boone, LLP (Houston) law-
yer George Gerard “Guy” Young III, October 17, 1955–April 19, 2015.
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“[T]he stairway which leads to a dark gulf. It is a fine broad
stairway at the beginning, but after a bit, the carpet ends. A little
further on there are only flagstones, and a little further on still
these break beneath your feet.”1
—Winston Churchill
I. INTRODUCTION
OWNERS of nonparticipating royalty interests (NPRIs) in Texashave long held an enviable position. Unlike the owner of theexecutive right—who cannot authorize pooling of a nonexecu-
tive interest such as an NPRI, absent language in the original severance
that allows such—the NPRI owner has a choice whether or not to ratify
the pooling.2 This choice, in turn, depends on whether or not the NPRI is
located in the pooled tracts with the producing well.3 If the producing
well is a non-tract well with regard to a particular NPRI, that NPRI’s
owner will typically ratify the lease in order to acquire a share of the
production based on the acreage of the NPRI tract relative to the total
pooled acreage. Alternatively, if the well is located on the same tract as
the NPRI, the NPRI owner will probably choose not to ratify the pooling
so as not to dilute the amount of royalty received by apportionment of
royalties across the acreage of the entire pool.
This privileged position, once established, was apparently expanded in
the 1980s so that the implied offer to pool an NPRI that came freighted
with the inclusion of a pooling clause in a lease that covered the NPRI
tract was triggered even if (1) no pooling occurs and (2) the lease contains
an anti-entireties (or anti-communitization) clause.4 In addition, case law
emerged that attempted to define exactly what action by an NPRI owner
ratified a lease or not, such as suing the executive, executing and filing of
record a lease counterpart, or drafting a ratification and filing that of
record.
Meanwhile, legal education and professional practice seemed to set in
judicial granite this position of the NPRI owner in the eyes of Texas oil
and gas jurisprudence: whatever the acreage of the leases involved and
whatever their terms might be, the NPRI owner inexplicably got to
choose, sua sponte, whether to ratify the lease. One commentator demon-
strated the practical result of this curious precedent with this example:
The owner of the executive right owns the mineral estate in two ad-
joining tracts, Tract A and Tract B. Only Tract B is burdened with [an
NPRI]. The executive enters into a [community] lease covering both
1. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, WHILE ENGLAND SLEPT: A SURVEY OF WORLD AF-
FAIRS, 1932–1938, at 403 (1938).
2. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 4.8(B)(1) (2d ed. 2019).
3. See id.
4. See London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied); 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 4.8(B)(2).
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[tracts]. The lease contains a pooling clause, but also contains [an]
anti-communitization clause . . . . A well is drilled on Tract A. There
is no pooling of Tract A with Tract B or any other tract. Nonetheless,
under [Texas case law], if the owner of the nonexecutive interest rati-
fies the lease, he is then entitled to share in production from the well
on Tract A—notwithstanding the fact that the anti-communization
clause contained in the lease expressly rejects any apportionment of
royalties.5
This article first examines the individual components involved in these
freestanding royalty imbroglios—NPRIs, entireties clauses and anti-en-
tireties clauses, community leases, and ratifications. Next, this article ex-
amines the parade of cases that led to the current situation in Texas—
dealing first with communitization/unitization cases, then lease ratifica-
tion cases—so that the progression of fact-specific situations that have
combined to yield the favorable position of NPRIs is better understood.
The current jurisprudential landscape of NPRIs and the ratification of
leases is then summarized.
Finally, the paper concludes that an NPRI owner’s ratification should
not be necessary to authorize the pooling of its executive and that to
grant the NPRI owner such authority would be contrary to existing Texas
public policy. If Texas courts are unwilling to go that far, it is argued they
should at least recognize that when an NPRI owner files ratifications of
leases in which the NPRI owner expressly agrees to make its NPRI sub-
ject to the terms of the leases, including terms providing for tract-basis
payment of royalty and clauses establishing separate leases for each pro-
ration unit, the NPRI is subject to all such terms. In the meantime, it is
proposed that lessors and lessees can use some defensive strategies such
as strategic drafting and ratification as well as the use of allocation wells
to protect themselves.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. NONPARTICIPATING ROYALTY INTERESTS
A severed mineral estate in Texas possesses five attributes: “(1) the
right to develop (the right of ingress and egress), (2) the right to lease
(the executive right), (3) the right to receive bonus payments, (4) the
right to receive delay rentals, and (5) the right to receive royalty pay-
ments.”6 Additionally:
[E]ach attribute is a separate, distinct property interest that may be
conveyed or reserved in connection with a conveyance of a mineral
interest. “However, ‘[w]hen an undivided mineral interest is con-
veyed, reserved, or excepted, it is presumed that all attributes remain
5. Karen E. Lynch, Problems Caused by Nonexecutive Interests Under Multi-Tract
Leases: Brown v. Smith to London v. Merriman, ST. BAR SEC. REP, OIL, GAS & MIN. L.,
Dec. 1990, at 1, 1.
6. Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986); accord Hamilton v. Morris Res.,
225 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
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with the mineral interest unless a contrary intent is expressed.’”7
Royalty in the oil and gas context in Texas is commonly defined as a
nonpossessory interest in real property.8 Owners of royalty receive a frac-
tion of the produced hydrocarbons without having to pay any of the ex-
ploration and production costs.9 Due to substandard drafting and
inconsistent case law, an enormous amount of litigation, academic analy-
sis, and general hand-wringing has risen over the decades around whether
a conveyed or reserved interest is a royalty or an (generally fractional)
interest in the actual minerals—a bundle of sticks that when complete
includes the right to a landowner’s royalty.
Royalty interests are often categorized into three distinct groups. One
is the lessor’s (or landowner’s) royalty, a royalty interest that is retained
when a mineral owner (the landowner) executes a mineral lease.10 This
interest is effective during the duration of the lease11 and is determined
through a negotiation between the mineral owner and the lessee, typically
an oil and gas company or a broker.12 It is generally a fixed fraction of the
gross production, perhaps varying depending on the volume of
production.13
In contrast to a lessor’s royalty, an NPRI is “[a]n expense-free” real
property mineral interest that does not participate (hence the name) in
collecting bonus or delay rentals, leasing, or exploration and develop-
ment.14 This interest is “non-possessory in that it does not entitle its
owner to produce the minerals himself,”15 as one Texas court described it.
“It merely entitles its owner to a share of the production proceeds, free of
the expenses of exploration and production.”16 The executive’s royalty is
reduced by the amount of the NPRI because of the Duhig doctrine.17 The
size of an NPRI can be expressed in one of two ways: (1) the NPRI can
7. Hamilton, 225 S.W.3d at 344 (quoting French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d
795, 797 (Tex. 1995)).
8. See 2 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 2.4(A).
9. Id.
10. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 2.4(B)(1).
11. Id.
12. JOSEPH SHADE & RONNIE BLACKWELL, PRIMER ON THE TEXAS LAW OF OIL &
GAS 26 (5th ed. 2013).
13. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 2.4(B)(2).
14. See SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 12, at 154. The third kind of royalty, not
discussed in this article, is the overriding royalty interest. This is described as “[a]n interest
in oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense of production. In modern times
overriding royalty interests usually refers to a non-cost bearing interest carved out of the
lessee’s working interest under an oil and gas lease.” Id.
15. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis omit-
ted); accord Hamilton v. Morris Res., 225 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007,
pet. denied).
16. Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 789; accord Hamilton, 225 S.W.3d at 344.
17. See Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 879–80 (Tex. 1940). The
Duhig doctrine generally provides that where full effect cannot be given both to a granted
interest (i.e., the right to collect profits granted in the lease to the lessee) and to a reserved
interest (i.e., the lessor’s royalty reserved in the lease) in a conveyance, the courts will give
priority to the granted interest until the granted interest is fully satisfied. See id. Therefore,
NPRIs are subtracted from the lessor’s royalty. See id.
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be reserved or conveyed as a fixed fraction of gross production, com-
monly one-sixteenth, or (2) it can be dependent upon the lessor’s royalty
in the existing lease and every lease covering the captioned land thereaf-
ter.18 In the second instance, the NPRI fraction is typically multiplied by
whatever lessor’s royalty is found in the existing oil and gas lease cover-
ing the captioned land.19
B. NON-APPORTIONMENT AND ENTIRETIES/
ANTI-ENTIRETIES CLAUSES
In what has become known as the “non-apportionment rule,” the Su-
preme Court of Texas has accepted the following principle:
Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execu-
tion of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the
production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of
the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the
lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties there-
from belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well
is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased
premises have no interest therein.20
This is true unless the conveyance of a portion of the leased mineral
interest provides otherwise.21
The non-apportionment doctrine is still the rule in Texas and the ma-
jority of other relevant jurisdictions, although its fairness has been ques-
tioned.22 State legislatures and courts have been urged to adopt instead a
rule apportioning royalties among the owners of the subdivided tract.23
The non-apportionment doctrine is so ingrained in Texas jurisprudence,
however, that “the spacing and density rules of the Railroad Commission
[may] prohibit drilling on one of the [subdivided] tracts resulting from the
subdivision . . . [even though] that tract is being drained by the producing
18. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 2.4(B)(2).
19. Id.
For example, the owner of an NPRI that gave him the right to ‘one-eighth of
royalty’ would be entitled to receive 1/64 of the gross production from a lease
containing a 1/8 lessor’s royalty (1/8 × 1/8), but would receive 1/48 of the
gross production from a lease containing a 1/6 lessor’s royalty (1/8 × 1/6).
This amount is [paid out of the gross production] from the lessor’s royalty
owed to the lessor himself. Unless uncommon terms are at play, the lessee
continues to pay only the amount of the lessor’s royalty; he does not typically
pay the sum of the lessor’s royalty and the NPRI.
Christopher S. Kulander, Fixed vs. Floating Non-Participating Oil & Gas Royalty in Texas:
And the Battles Rage On . . ., 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 41, 44 n.14 (2016).
20. Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669, 670 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, judgm’t adopted).
21. See id.
22. JOHN LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 647 n.2 (7th ed.
2018).
23. See, e.g., William O. Huie, Apportionment of Oil and Gas Royalties, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1113, 1133–34 (1965).
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well.”24
In response to this rule, parties have used lease language known as an
entirety (or entireties) clause that is meant to avoid later application of
the non-apportionment rule.25 The main practical feature of an entireties
clause concerns the payment of royalties and typically requires the pay-
ment to a party who owned no interest in the tract where a well was
producing.26 For example, such a clause might read:
If the leased premises shall hereafter be owned severally or in sepa-
rate tracts, the premises nevertheless shall be developed and oper-
ated as one lease and all royalties accruing hereunder shall be
treated as an entirety and shall be divided among and paid to such
separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by each
such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage.27
The entirety clause is not used as frequently today as it once was. A
lessee may find that an entireties clause imposes a heavy administrative
burden if the land subject to lease is subdivided into many small tracts, as
may happen with a residential subdivision, because each owner of the
subsequently created tracts—every house on the new block, as it were—is
due a portion of royalties for the well that is probably on the larger por-
tion of the original leased tract that is still owned by Farmer Brown, the
lessor, or his successor.28 It can be onerous to update the division orders
made necessary by production on tracts that were subdivided post-leas-
ing. Case law can provide some frights to those relying on entireties
clauses as well, as a couple of the cases described below will show.
C. COMMUNITY LEASES AND RATIFICATIONS
The term “community lease,” as it is most commonly used in industry
custom and practice, refers to a single lease comprising several separate
tracts with separate lessors each executing a single lease form or counter-
parts of same.29 In Texas, a community lease triggers actual pooling as a
matter of law—the lessee is allowed to treat all tracts and interests exe-
cuting the lease or a counterpart as a single “leased premises.”30 Commu-
nity leases are relatively rare and are becoming even more so, but they
may arise unintentionally.31 Unless the terms of the community lease pro-
24. LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 647 n.4; see also Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v.
Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. 1955); Mueller v. Sutherland, 179 S.W.2d 801, 807–08
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1943, writ ref’d w.o.m.).
25. Huie, supra note 23, at 1120 n.12.
26. Robert E. Hardwicke & Robert E. Hardwicke, Jr., Apportionment of Royalty to
Separate Tracts: The Entirety Clause and the Community Lease, 32 TEX. L. REV. 660,
671–72 (1954).
27. Id. at 660.
28. Bruce M. Kramer, The Nuts and Bolts of Pooling: A Primer for the Uninitiated, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS 24TH ANNUAL ADVANCED OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY RESOURCES
LAW COURSE ch. 16, at 2 (2016).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 4.8(B)(2).
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vide otherwise, royalties accruing under the community lease are appor-
tioned among the lessors in proportion to the ratio between the area
covered by any particular tract or undivided interest and the total acreage
covered by the lease.32 If a lease is deemed a community lease, it is com-
munitized at the time of execution and not upon some later event, such as
when an NPRI owner within the leased acreage files ratifications of said
leases in the public property records.33
A cotenant can lease his or her undivided mineral interest without join-
der from the other cotenants.34 The cotenants’ remedies, however, are to
either (1) ratify the lease and request an accounting for all profits re-
ceived by the leasing cotenant,35 or (2) refuse to ratify the lease and col-
lect the value proportionate to their share of the minerals less reasonable
production expenses.36 Ratification of a lease places the ratifying party’s
mineral or royalty interest under the terms of the lease.37
III. TEXAS CASE LAW INVOLVING COMMUNITY LEASES,
POOLS, AND ROYALTY
In 1943, the Supreme Court of Texas handed down its holding in Veal
v. Thomason,38 spawning the first case in a panoply of opinions that
would lead, step by step, to modern ratification jurisprudence. The first
round of cases involved the definition of community leases and the effect
of community leases on royalty payments. Building on that, the second
round of cases considered NPRIs and the effects of ratification on royalty
payments.
A. COMMUNIZATION/UNITIZATION CASES
The following quintet of cases deals primarily with community leases
and features such questions as whether payment of rentals covering one
part of the combined tract carries it all, whether production anywhere in
a community lease maintains the whole lease, and whether parties to
community leases not on the well tract are due a portion of the royalty.
The opening group of cases primarily involved mineral owners; only one,
Brown v. Smith, dealt directly with an NPRI.39 These opinions were re-
leased in a stretch from 1940 to 1952, with four released from 1940 to
1943.
32. See Kramer, supra note 28, at 2.
33. See id.
34. Aycock v. Vantage Fort Worth Energy, No. 11–13–00338–CV, 2015 WL 1322003,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
187 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (citing Burnham v. Hardy
Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 334 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1912), aff’d, 195 S.W. 1139, 1146 (Tex.
1917)).
35. Tex. & Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619, 624 (Tex. App.—Eastland
1926, writ ref’d).
36. Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965).
37. See Tex. & Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 288 S.W. at 624.
38. 159 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1942).
39. See Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. 1943).
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1. Parker v. Parker
In Parker v. Parker, the Galveston Court of Appeals opened the com-
munization ball in Texas by considering whether parties who owned dis-
crete, contiguous mineral tracts and executed a single instrument that
purported to lease all the tracts as if they were one large tract had, in
effect, pooled their interests.40 Such unitization would result in the les-
sor’s royalty being shared by all lessors on an apportioned basis.
In 1935, seven parties executed one lease in Cass County, Texas,
wherein the lands covered were described as a single tract.41 The lease
provided that payment of royalty to each lessor would be made pro rata
based on acreage.42 At trial, the jury found that the lessors had orally
agreed that the lease was to be considered unitized.43 Production was
achieved on some of the tracts, while others remained fallow.44 The own-
ers of the non-drilled tracts received delay rental payments.45 Some ac-
cepted the delay rentals while others did not.46 Eventually, the owners of
the non-drilled tracts sued, claiming that they were owed royalty appor-
tioned on an acreage basis instead of delay rentals.47 The trial court
agreed, finding that the lease was unitized and that the royalty should be
apportioned on an acreage-pro-rata basis.48
Citing West Virginia and Louisiana law, the court of appeals affirmed,
quoting the Supreme Court of West Virginia opining on a nearly identical
situation: “Nowhere in the lease is there an intimation of several owner-
ships of parts of it, or a suggestion of intent to make separate tenan-
cies.”49 The court of appeals took notice that the lessors had allowed the
lessee to treat the entire 244 acres as being subject to common ownership
and allowed the lessee to keep the entire lease by drilling anywhere on
it.50 In addition, “lessor” was defined in the captioned lease as, collec-
tively, all the lessors, not any one singly.51
2. Veal v. Thomason
In Veal v. Thomason, the Texas Supreme Court first considered the
way in which royalties would be split among multiple parties who exe-
cuted separate, identical counterparts to a multi-tract “unitized” lease.52
The lease form provided that each lessor would participate in royalties in
40. Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303, 303 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1940, writ ref’d).
41. Id.
42. Id.






49. Id. (quoting S. Penn. Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 76 S.E. 961, 963 (W. Va. 1912)).
50. Id. at 305.
51. Id.
52. Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. 1942).
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the proportion of ownership of each lessor to the total leased acreage.53
The court’s choice came down to either apportioned royalties uniformly
owned across all the tracts or royalties that accrued on an individual-tract
basis.54
The trial court dismissed the suit.55 Upon appeal, the court of appeals
reversed and held, among other positions, that the other lessors were not
necessary parties to the suit as their royalty interests would not be af-
fected by the outcome of the quiet title action instigated by the
Thomasons.56 This position, the supreme court believed, would necessa-
rily entail that the individual leases constituting the unitized block would
“only operate to reserve to the respective lessors . . . the royalty stipu-
lated in [this] lease contract.”57 In other words, each lessor was entitled to
a tract-based lessor’s royalty, not a royalty apportioned across the en-
tirety of the leased acreage.
After a lengthy deconstruction of various terms of the lease, the Su-
preme Court of Texas overturned the court of appeals and affirmed the
district court’s judgment.58 Specifically, the court noted that paragraph 3
of the lease provided that the lessor’s royalty to be paid on production
was “reserved by lessor for the benefit of himself and other lessors exe-
cuting similar leases in the unitized block.”59 Further on, the court de-
scribed how paragraph 4(b) of the lease allowed that:
[I]t is agreed and covenanted that each lessor in said similar lease
covering land in said unitized block will participate in the royalty
herein provided from oil, gas or other mimerals [sic] produced from
this land if, when and as produced and sold, in the exact proportion
as the individual royalty owner’s interest in any tract bears to the
aggregate number of acres still held by lessee . . . .60
Finally, the court took note of paragraph 9, which read:
It is understood and agreed that any royalty payable under this lease
or similar leases on the unitized block shall be paid to the [bank] for
the benefit of the lessor herein and lessors executing similar leases
on land in said unitized block and for the purpose of accomplishing
this, the named lessors do hereby designate said bank as their agent
to receive payment for all of them and lessee shall not be required to
make payments to such persons except through the designated
agent.61
From these recitations, the court then summarized the result: each les-
sor would reap lessor’s royalty from production calculated equal to his
53. Id. at 474.
54. See id. at 475.
55. Id. at 474.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 475.
58. Id. at 477.
59. Id. at 473.
60. Id. at 474.
61. Id.
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individual tract’s acreage apportioned across the acreage of all the leases
in the unitized tract.62 Likewise, the court noticed that the individual les-
sors could not even directly collect lessor’s royalty from their individual
tracts or any other acreage in the unitized block—all the money accruing
as lessor’s royalty went to the named bank.63 Ultimately, the court held
that when the leases were “read and construed from [their] four corners,”
no other interpretation was possible.64
Given both the express provisions of the leases and the apparent intent
of the leasing parties that can be surmised from other lease terms, the
result in Thomason is not surprising. The leases were clearly unitized—
the entireties clauses evidenced clear intent to apportion royalties. In ad-
dition, all of the lessor’s royalty paid under each lease form went into the
same repository.
3. French v. George
Released one month after Veal and reflexively cited to this day by
scholars, courts, and NPRI owners seeking to establish that royalties
within a community lease should be divided among lessors in the propor-
tion that their acreage bears to the total acreage of a multi-tract lease,
French v. George65 bears a closer look. At the start of 1937, a group of
parties owning all of the mineral rights within a portion of land in
Wheeler County, Texas, executed to DuMar Oil Gas Company (DuMar)
an oil and gas lease covering 240 acres.66 The land included in the lease
was “described in separate tracts and [comprised] the E/2 of the NW/4,
the S/2 of the NE/4, and the E/2 of the SE/4” of the section.67 The lease
had a primary term of ten years and provided that “if a well should not be
commenced on the [captioned] land within one year from its date [of exe-
cution], the lease could be continued in force by the payment of rentals in
the sum of $240 each [year] during the primary term.”68 All the lessors,
whether one or more, were designated as “the lessor,” and the royalty
reserved was to be paid or delivered to the lessor.69
DuMar completed a producer on the SE/4 of the NW/4 of the section
in September 1937.70 When one group of lessors (collectively, George)—
those with no interest in the drill tract—brought suit to recover the roy-
alty due from the production and sale of gas from the well, DuMar inter-
pleaded the lessors with mineral interests in the drill tract (collectively,
French) as cross-defendants and asked the court to determine how the
royalty should be paid.71 At a bench trial, the district court “decreed that
62. Id. at 476.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 159 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1942, writ ref’d).
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the lease was a unitized or pooling instrument”; therefore, all of the les-
sors were due a portion of the lessor’s royalty on an acreage-apportioned,
pro rata basis.72
On appeal, French argued that the lease was not a pooling or unitized
lease and claimed that the royalty should have been instead paid to the
lessors by the proportion of mineral ownership that the lessors had in any
particular tract within the lease.73 The court of appeals affirmed, how-
ever, noting that the lease was that of an “ordinary form” and that “no
provision or suggestion contained in it . . . is different in any respect from
what it would have been if it had been executed by only one lessor.”74 In
addition, the ordinary form lease provided that the lessors each had
waived the implied covenant to drill offset wells, seemingly furthering the
intent to pay royalty on a lease-wide basis instead of on a tract basis.75 If
the lessors were not concerned about drainage, the court believed, this
suggested that they expected to be paid on a lease-wide basis in which
incidents of drainage from one tract within the lease to another would not
impact recovery from an undrilled tract and, hence, would not affect the
amount of royalty to be paid to the mineral owners of the tract experienc-
ing intra-lease drainage.76
Of particular interest to the court in deciding how the lease royalty was
to be paid was the size of the lease in relation to the spacing unit for a gas
well.77 The court noted that if the French interpretation prevailed, a gas
unit of 160 acres would hold the entire 240-acre lease as long as the well-
produced in paying quantities.78 This would potentially leave mineral
owners in the leftover 80 acres bereft of royalties and without opportu-
nity to lease their minerals again until the current lease expired—possibly
after all their hydrocarbons were gone. Since only a few of the mineral
owners in the leasehold held mineral tracts larger than 40 acres, the court
regarded this scenario as entirely possible.79 The court found it difficult to
imagine that a lessor would intend that result to be a possibility, particu-
larly since the lessors could have expressly provided for tract-basis roy-
alty payments in the lease terms.80 At multiple points in the opinion, the
court said that the terms of the lease control whether the lease should be
considered a “unitizing or pooling” agreement and that, in the absence of
terms to the contrary, the royalties should be paid in the proportion that
any particular lessor’s acreage bears to the entire lease.81
72. Id. at 567–68.
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4. Brown v. Smith
The Texas Supreme Court once again considered a multi-tract lease but
this time one partially encumbered by an NPRI in Brown v. Smith.82 The
result was a ruling that started the troublesome trend in Texas toward
placing NPRI owners at once beyond the reach of executives and in the
privileged position of choosing to ratify a lease depending on the location
of their tract to a producing well.
In Brown, a mineral owner possessed a 20-acre tract encumbered by a
1/32 NPRI.83 Another mineral owner owned the entire mineral estate in a
neighboring tract measuring 42.75 acres.84 Both mineral owners executed
the same oil and gas lease, which described both of the tracts and covered
62.75 acres in total.85 While the lease mentioned the acreage split, it also
contained a clause that expressly pooled both of the tracts: “Of the acre-
age above described . . . it is understood and agreed as between Lessors,
that the rents and royalties hereinafter stipulated to be paid on said 62.75
acre tract are to be pooled and shared by said Lessors in proportion to
acreage owned.”86
The parties executed a lease for which delivery of consideration was
subject to various terms and conditions, namely: the lessors delivering
abstracts of title, time for the lessees to examine same, and the finding by
lessees that lessors had good title.87 A dispute arose over whether the
existence of the NPRI encumbering the 20-acre tract violated a guarantee
of lessor’s title made necessary by the lessees before they would release
from escrow for delivery to the lessors the amount of $6,275.88 The les-
sees claimed that the existence of the NPRI constituted faulty title to the
degree such that they would not have to honor the contract for sale.89
The case eventually turned on whether the lessors could have pooled the
NPRI through execution of the lease.90 The trial and appellate courts
held that the executives had pooled the NPRI,91 a perspicuous position.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and held that the NPRI was not
included in the pool.92 Citing Veal—then just a year old—the court noted
that a lease jointly executed by two or more lessors of separate tracts, and
which contained provisions providing for the pooling of royalties (on an
acreage basis) from production anywhere on the lease, “has the effect of
vesting all of the lessors, at least during the life of the lease, ‘with joint
ownership of the royalty earned from all the land in such block.’”93 If the
82. 174 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. 1943).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id. at 44–45.
87. Id. at 44.
88. Id. at 45.
89. Id. at 44.
90. See id. at 45–46.
91. See id. at 44, 47.
92. See id. at 46–47.
93. Id. at 46 (quoting Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472, 476 (Tex. 1942)).
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NPRI owner had joined in the lease, the court opined, she would have
necessarily subjected her interest to the lease’s embedded pooling agree-
ment; therefore, she would have conveyed to the 42.75-acre tract owner a
portion of her NPRI covering the 20-acre tract and would likewise have
become an owner of the royalty in the 42.75 acres.94 By not executing the
lease, the NPRI owner did not divest herself of any part of her NPRI in
the 20-acre tract and did not gain any interest in the royalty arising from
the 42.75-acre tract.95
This decision was reached despite the fact the community lease was
also expressly pooled upon execution.96 In a thunderbolt, the court had
solidified the curious Texan oil and gas rule that the executive is pre-
cluded from pooling an NPRI. The Supreme Court of Texas excused this
stance by explaining that a lessor could dilute the ownership interest of
an NPRI owner across an entire pool, since under Texas law, pooling
leasehold interests generally results in a cross-conveyance by each pooled
lessor to all the other lessors of its leasehold interest resulting in multiple
undivided interests across the entire pool.97
5. Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble
Finally, in 1952, the Texas Supreme Court rang down the curtain on the
community lease litigation outbreak with Southland Royalty Co. v. Hum-
ble Oil & Refining Co., which considered whether production anywhere
in a community lease should maintain the whole lease.98 In 1925, the
Powells, owners of a 640-acre square of land in fee (the Section), con-
veyed one-half of the minerals in the south half—320 acres—to
Youngmeyer.99 Later that year, the Powells conveyed one-half of the
minerals in the northwest quarter (160 acres) and in the northeast quarter
of the southwest quarter (40 acres) of the Section to Southland Royalty
Company (Southland).100 The grant to Southland was “limited to a pe-
riod of twenty years from the date of the deed ‘and as long thereafter as
oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said land.’”101 Subsequently,
“[i]n 1926[,] Southland sold a 1/32nd interest in the minerals in [its two]
tracts,” which eventually wound up owned by Sneed.102 Therefore, after
the conveyances, the Powells and Southland each owned an undivided
half of the minerals in the 160-acre tract, and Youngmeyer and Southland
each owned an undivided half of the minerals in the 40-acre tract (with
both defeasible interests of Southland subject to the defeasible 1/32 inter-
est owned by Sneed’s predecessor).103 Powell owned a reversionary inter-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 44–45.
97. See id. at 46.
98. Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 249 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1952).
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est in the minerals owned by Southland and its grantees.104
Approximately four years later, in 1932, “the Powells, Youngmeyer,
Southland, Sneed’s predecessor in title and others . . . jointly executed
[and conveyed] to Gulf Production Company [(Gulf)] a general mineral
lease” covering 250 acres, comprising the aforementioned 160 and 40-
acre tracts and the north 50 acres of the west one-half of the southwest
quarter of the Section.105 “Gulf assigned its lease to a depth of 3000 feet
to Garrett M. Smith who completed [in 1941] two producing wells on the
50 acre tract” in the west one-half of the southwest quarter of the Sec-
tion.106 “No wells were drilled on either the 160 acre tract or the 40 acre
tract in which Southland owned a mineral interest until after” twenty
years had elapsed from the date of the deed from the Powells to South-
land.107 Also in 1932, the Powells conveyed all mineral rights they owned
“in the section, including all ‘reversionary’ rights” to Humble; half of
which Humble then conveyed to Continental Oil Company.108
A dispute arose as to whether the production on the 50-acre tract in the
west one-half of the southwest quarter of the Section kept the defeasible
interest owned by Southland from reverting back to Humble.109 Whether
or not that happened, in turn, depended on whether the jointly executed
lease had effected a unitization of all three tracts constituting the cap-
tioned land.110 Humble, while acknowledging that the precedent of
Parker and French would suggest that the three tracts described in the
lease were unitized so production from any covered tract entitled South-
land to apportioned royalties for twenty years, argued that Southland’s
interest had ended after twenty years because no actual production had
taken place on the two defeasible tracts.111
The trial court found for Southland.112 The El Paso Court of Appeals
reversed, believing that the trial court had expanded the defeasible grants
past its expressed terms.113 Upon appeal to the Texas Supreme Court,
Humble contended that the jurisprudence of Parker and French should
be re-examined and that “courts should not attribute to lessors jointly
executing a general form lease, without more, an intent to pool or unitize
their properties; that the language of the general form lease was never
intended to effect or to operate as a pooling agreement.”114 Despite first
conceding that Humble’s argument was “not entirely unappealing,” the
court nevertheless reversed the El Paso court, noting that Parker and
104. Id. at 915.
105. Id. at 914–15.
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French had become accepted real property precedent in Texas.115
In the final pages of the court’s opinion, it was noted twice that “in the
absence of express agreement” the form lease unitized the three tracts, so
production from any one tract maintained the lease and, in this case, the
disputed defeasible interest.116 In this instance, the royalty payment
clauses and other lease terms did nothing to suggest a separate-tract basis
for royalty calculations.117 Presumably, then, this arrangement could have
been altered with specific lease terms to the contrary.
B. RATIFICATION CASES
The following six cases largely deal with ratification of pooled leases by
NPRI owners seeking royalty. The opinions were released from 1968 to
1988. They largely provide the jurisprudential prism through which we
commonly look at how and when NPRI owners can ratify leases in Texas
and what actions may constitute constructive ratification.
1. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher
In Montgomery v. Rittersbacher,118 Montgomery was the owner of a
freestanding royalty interest119 in eighty acres of land, designated in the
record as the “First Tract.”120 Respondents (collectively, Rittersbacher)
held the executive rights to the First Tract and also owned executive
rights in adjacent land, designated in the record as the “Second Tract.”121
Rittersbacher leased both the First Tract and the Second Tract under a
single lease.122 The lease contained a pooling clause and an entireties
clause.123 The entireties clause provided as follows:
If the leased premises are now or shall hereafter be owned in sever-
alty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, shall be devel-
oped and operated as one lease, and all royalties accruing hereunder
shall be treated as an entirety and shall be divided among and paid to
such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by
each such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage.124
Sun Oil Company (Sun), the lessee, “formed several units out of the
original leased acreage.”125 A portion of the Second Tract was pooled
with other land, designated in the record as the “Crutchfield tract.”126
Sun completed a producing well on the Crutchfield tract but drilled a
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 915.
118. 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968).
119. A freestanding royalty interest is the same as an NPRI.
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duster in the unit that included the First Tract.127 Montgomery brought
suit claiming to have ratified the lease and claiming a share of the royal-
ties by virtue of the entireties clause from the production on the Crutch-
field tract.128 The court of appeals ruled in favor of Rittersbacher, and
Montgomery appealed.129
The Texas Supreme Court reversed in favor of Montgomery, finding
that if a multi-tract lease is (a) pooled with outside acreage, (b) contains
both acreage encumbered by an NPRI and acreage not so encumbered,
or (c) both, such pooling and/or apportionment invoked an implied offer
in favor of the NPRI owner to apportion the royalties if the NPRI owner
chose to do so.130 In considering the pooling clause and the entireties
clause, the court opined:
We can see no distinction between the pooling clause, insofar as it
has the effect of changing the aggregate ownership of the non-partic-
ipating royalty owner, and the entiret[ies] clause, which, in effect,
would allow the holder of the executive rights to either diminish or
enlarge the ownership of that of the royalty owner. In either case,
the consent of the owner must be obtained.
. . . .
. . . The lease executed by [Rittersbacher] and the original lessee ex-
plicitly described the entire tract in which Montgomery had a non-
participating interest as being covered by the lease. The unambigu-
ous entirety clause clearly indicates that it was to apply to all the
interests covered by the lease. The clause points out that even if the
premises are owned in severalty at the time of the execution of the
lease, as the premises were in this case, “the (leased) premises, never-
theless shall be developed and operated as one lease, and all royalties
accruing hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and shall be di-
vided among and paid to such separate owners in the proportion that
the acreage owned by each bears to the entire leased acreage” . . . .
This Court has held that an “are now” entirety clause as was con-
tained in the present lease applies to minerals held in severalty at the
time of the execution of the lease.131
Furthermore, this offer was accepted by ratifying the lease or even just
filing suit to seek apportioned royalties from the off-lease well.132 Ritter-
sbacher argued that, since they did not have the power to invoke any
provision in the lease that might somehow lessen the NPRI owner’s roy-
alty through pooling and/or apportionment, the NPRI owner should not
be free to selectively invoke clauses in the lease that allowed him to col-
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NPRI.133 But later in the opinion, the court dispatched that sagacious
notion with a leaden knell:
This Court has never been called upon to decide the question of
whether a holder of non-participating royalty has an option to make
an entirety clause operative on his interest. We think that the non-
participating royalty owner, so far as the existence of an option is
concerned, occupies a comparable position to that of a cotenant
under a lease made by his cotenant or a non-participating royalty
owner under a pooling agreement made by the holder of the execu-
tive rights. As to the cotenant, it has been held that he has the right
to ratify or repudiate a lease made by his cotenant which covers his
interest. Likewise, in the pooling area, if a non-participating royalty
owner ratifies a pooling agreement, either by joining in the execution
of the agreement or by accepting royalties from the pool, his interest
is bound by the pooling agreement. Therefore, we hold that the non-
participating royalty owner has the option to ratify or repudiate a
lease containing provisions which as to his interest the holder of the
executive rights had no authority to insert in the lease.
Montgomery, in bringing this suit, seeks two things under the lease—
royalties that have already accrued and royalties that are to accrue in the
future. We have held that Montgomery has ratified the lease in question
by filing suit; consequently, he is only entitled to receive royalties accru-
ing from and after May 12, 1964, the date this suit was filed. In this con-
nection, we point out that Montgomery, having thus ratified the lease, is
as much bound thereby as if he had joined in the original execution
thereof. As long as the lease is in force, he is not free to claim his full 1/2
non-participating interest under “First Tract.”134
By finding that the lessor had somehow made an implied offer to pool
or apportion the NPRI acreage with either acreage outside the lease or
unencumbered acreage within the lease, respectively, the court signifi-
cantly empowered the NPRI owner. Presumably, under this jurispru-
dence, unless the court treated the entireties clause and pooling clause as
indivisible, Montgomery could have ratified the lease insofar as the en-
tireties clause was concerned and, yet, disavowed the pooling. If the well
drilled on the Crutchfield tract had been located on the Second Tract,
then Montgomery would have wanted to ratify only the entireties clause.
If a prolific well had been drilled on a tract pooled with the First Tract,
then Montgomery would have wanted to ratify only the pooling clause.
The court’s majority particularly focused on the presence and wording
of the entireties clause, noting that had Rittersbacher “not intended to
include Montgomery’s nonparticipating interest within the provisions of
the entirety clause, they could have easily taken affirmative steps to ex-
clude the interest from the operations of the clause.”135 This thought—
133. Id. at 213.
134. Id. at 215–16 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 213. The entireties clause expressly operated where “the leased premises are
now or shall hereafter be owned in severalty.” Id. at 212.
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while seemingly highlighting an outlet available to the lessor that would
have facilitated precluding an NPRI owner from seeking an apportioned
portion of the royalty from production from any portion of a multi-tract
lease (i.e., inclusion of an anti-entireties clause, perhaps one that ex-
pressly applies to any NPRI within the captioned acreage)—is curious,
given the fact that actions such as pooling made on part of the lessor
cannot be binding on the NPRI owner without its consent in the first
place.136
Justice Griffin dissented regarding this expansive interpretation of the
effect of the entireties clause on NPRIs, noting:
The entirety clause in a lease was never intended to convey and does
not convey any interest owned by any land owner or mineral owner
in any tract of land in any lease. It merely provides for each person
to receive such part of the common production as was the ownership
of the one who receives in his original tract of land or minerals.137
2. Ruiz v. Martin
Ruiz v. Martin, a 1977 decision from the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals, considered whether an NPRI owner got a portion of the royalty
derived from a lease where the NPRI encumbered one tract in the lease
while another contained a producing well.138 The lease, executed June 14,
1968, covered 600 acres total.139 The lease form at issue, another short-
form “Producer’s 88,” did not include an entireties clause but did provide
for pooling or unitization.140 The NPRI owner ratified the lease by an
instrument dated December 9, 1974, which provided that ratification of
the lease occurred “to the same extent as if [the NPRI owner] had origi-
nally joined in the execution thereof.”141
The trial court found that the NPRI owner should have received an
apportioned part of the royalty despite Texas’s non-apportionment rule
because use of the community lease and the subsequent ratification “ef-
fected a cross-conveyance of royalty agreement between them . . . for the
reason that the . . . lease did not purport to bind [the NPRI owner].”142
Basing its opinion on Parker, Montgomery, Southland, French, and
others, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.143 First, the court
noted that, in the case of an “ordinary” oil and gas lease, if it is executed
by all the owners of different mineral interests in multiple tracts, the roy-
136. Id. at 213.
137. Id. at 216 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
138. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
139. Id. at 841.
140. Id. The court highlighted that “the lease [was] in a form sometimes referred to as a
Commercial Producer’s 88 lease. It contain[ed] an unless clause” and provided for a 1/8
lessor’s royalty for oil and gas produced. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 842, 844.
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alty is pooled and apportioned among them.144 Second, citing lengthy
portions of Montgomery, the court recited the Texas rule that an NPRI
owner “so far as the existence of an option [to make an entirety clause
operative on his NPRI] is concerned, . . . [the NPRI owner] has the right
to ratify or repudiate a lease made by his cotenant which covers his inter-
est.”145 The Ruiz court stuck to this ratification jurisprudence even
though, unlike in Montgomery, the lease in question did not contain an
entireties clause.146
3. Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc.
In Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc., the mineral owner leased two
tracts, Sections 27 and 29, in a single lease located in Hansford County,
Texas.147 “Each of the sections contain[ed] 320 acres of land, more or
less.”148 Section 27 was subject to a freestanding royalty interest owned
by one owner, and Section 29 was subject to a freestanding royalty inter-
est owned by another.149 Neither royalty owner ratified the lease, which
contained a unitization clause.150 The successor lessee brought in a gas
well on Section 29 and attempted, by use of a division order, to pool the
two sections constituting the entire leased acreage.151 Not surprisingly,
given the prior case law, the Section 27 NPRI owner executed the divi-
sion order, but the Section 29 NPRI owner refused.152
The successor lessee brought suit.153 After asserting that it was “an in-
nocent and disinterested stakeholder,” the successor lessee expressed
concern that it was “‘or may be exposed to double or multiple liability,’
and that it ‘ha[d] a reasonable doubt concerning the manner in which the
1/16th [NPRI] should be apportioned, if at all, as between the [NPRI
owners], and is faced with conflicting claims.”154 The trial court agreed
with the successor lessee and apportioned the two NPRIs across both sec-
tions.155 On appeal to the Amarillo Court of Appeals, the Section 29 roy-
alty owners argued that the trial court had erroneously unitized and
diluted their NPRI.156
Citing Montgomery, the court of appeals held that the NPRIs in Sec-
tions 27 and 29 were not pooled, and therefore, the Section 29 NPRI
144. Id. at 842.
145. Id. (quoting Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 214–15 (Tex. 1968)).
146. Id. at 841.
147. Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc., 626 S.W.2d 810, 811–12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1981, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
148. Id. at 811.
149. Id. at 812. The NPRIs were actually owned by multiple parties. For ease of analy-
sis, each NPRI is described herein as being undivided. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Specifically, all but one of the multiple NPRI owners refused to sign the divi-
sion order and ratify the lease. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 813.
156. Id.
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owner was entitled to a royalty on all production from the well on Section
29.157 The Section 27 NPRI owner was judged not to be entitled to any
royalty from the well on Section 29.158 The court concluded that the Sec-
tion 29 NPRI owner could claim full royalty without having to ratify a
pooling because the well was located on Section 29, and while the mineral
owner had clear authority to subject the NPRI to a lease, it had no au-
thority to pool the NPRI.159
With regard to why the NPRI owner on Section 27 was not entitled to
royalty, it remains unknown why the Section 27 NPRI owner’s execution
of a division order was insufficient to give it a royalty share of the Section
29 well even though the Section 29 NPRI owner had not executed the
division order. Apparently, the court felt that the division order was inva-
lid unless signed by all parties. Presumably, if the Section 27 NPRI had
ratified the lease, it would be entitled to an apportioned portion of royal-
ties in addition to the unapportioned portion of royalty owed to the Sec-
tion 29 NPRI owner—the exact situation about which the successor
lessee was concerned.
4. Verble v. Coffman
The Austin Court of Appeals, in Verble v. Coffman, continued to
sweeten the position of NPRI owners.160 Verble involved a dispute in
which a lessor owned all the mineral interest in a 149-acre tract encum-
bered by an NPRI that provided the owner would receive a royalty equal
to 1/2 of royalty (a “floating” NPRI).161 The north half of the NPRI was
owned by McAnelly and the south half by Verble.162 The lease contained
an anti-entireties clause.163 It also contained a pooling clause,164 common
to such Producer’s 88 lease forms:
Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and the power to pool
or combine the acreage covered by this lease or any portion thereof
as to oil and gas, or either of them, with any other land covered by
this lease, and/or with any other land, lease or leases in the immedi-
ate vicinity thereof to the extent hereinafter stipulated, when in
Lessee’s judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so in order prop-
erly to explore, or to develop and operate said leased premises in
compliance with the rules or regulations of the Railroad
Commission . . . .165
Both royalty owners ratified the lease.166 Coffman then brought a pro-
ducing well on the southern half of the tract and established a proration
157. Id. at 814.
158. Id. at 814–15.
159. Id. at 814.
160. Verble v. Coffman, 680 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App.—Austin, 1984, no writ).
161. Id. at 69, 70.
162. Id. at 69.
163. Id. at 70.
164. Id. at 69.
165. Lynch, supra note 5, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
166. Verble, 680 S.W.2d at 70.
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unit that covered the entire tract.167 Apparently looking toward the anti-
entireties clause, Coffman did not apportion the royalties, and McAnelly
sued, claiming an acreage-apportioned share of the royalty.168 Verble ar-
gued that apportionment of the NPRI was barred by the non-entireties
clause of the lease, as it nullified any communization of the NPRI.169
McAnelly countered that the express ratification by the NPRI owners
constituted an offer—and then acceptance—of pooling.170 The trial court
held for the NPRI owner seeking apportionment, ruling that McAnelly’s
royalty interests had been pooled, communitized, and therefore appor-
tioned over the entire tract.171
The court of appeals, in a three-page opinion, affirmed.172 Citing Mont-
gomery and Ruiz, the court held that “[r]atification of an oil and lease by
[NPRI] owners is only necessary to effect a pooling of production, and
such ratification has been construed as an offer made by the lessor, and
accepted by the royalty owners to apportion all proceeds from the
lease.”173 One commentator believes that the court apparently thought,
since the lessor (or lessee) had actively sought the ratifications, that the
lessor wanted the royalties apportioned.174 Crucially, the court did not
address why the ratifications by the NPRI owners, which ostensibly
meant they accepted all the terms of the lease, did not include their ac-
cepting application of the anti-entireties clause.
Further, while the Verble court strangely seems to suggest that the rea-
son for seeking ratification of the NPRI owners was to allow the anti-
entireties clause to be overridden and “constituted an offer to pool and
an acceptance of that offer,”175 the author believes a more likely reason
was that the lessee was looking to pool the leased acreage with land
outside the 149-acre tract and merely wanted the NPRI owners on board
with the lease as a well drilled on the NPRI acreage without such ratifica-
tions would have allowed the NPRI owner to collect the full measure of
royalty without apportionment with the outside pooled acreage.
5. London v. Merriman
Verble was largely overlooked at the time of its release, with producers
and lessors seemingly resigning it to the ash heap of outlier opinions pro-






172. Id. at 71.
173. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968); Ruiz v. Mar-
tin, 559 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Standard Oil Co. of
Tex. v. Donald, 321 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
174. Lynch, supra note 5, at 5.
175. Verble, 680 S.W.2d at 70.
176. Lynch, supra note 5, at 5.
177. 756 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied).
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later, was received with broader coverage and continues to resonate to-
day,178 perhaps because the London court made the foundation for its
decision clearer than the Verble court did.
In the case, London owned two adjacent tracts of land (the eastern
tract and the western tract).179 “The Merrimans owned a 1/16 [NPRI] in
the western Tract.”180 In 1980, London executed a single oil and gas lease
covering both the eastern and western tracts.181 This lease, a Producer’s
88 lease which contained an internal pooling clause (authorizing pooling
among the eastern and western tracts), also contained what
London characterize[d] as a “non-unitization” or “anti-communitiza-
tion” clause: “If this lease now or hereafter covers separate tracts, no
pooling or unitization of royalty interest as between any such sepa-
rate tracts is intended or shall be implied or result merely from the
inclusion of such separate tracts within this lease but Lessee shall
nevertheless have the right to pool as provided above with conse-
quent allocation of production as above provided. As used in this
paragraph 4, the words “separate tract” mean any tract with royalty
ownership differing, now or hereafter, either as to parties or
amounts, from that as to any other part of the leased premises.”182
The lease was later assigned to McCord Exploration.183 “In 1982, Mc-
Cord brought in successful gas wells on the eastern tract.”184 In March of
1984, the Merrimans secured compulsory pooling.185 Earlier, in 1983, the
Merrimans brought suit against both London and McCord on alternate
theories: (1) that McCord had breached his duty to protect the Mer-
rimans’ interest against drainage; and (2) that the Merrimans had ratified
the lease by merely filing suit in 1983 and, therefore, accepted London’s
offer in the lease to pool their 1/16 royalty interest in the western tract
with London’s interest in the eastern tract.186 The Merrimans succeeded
on both theories, but they elected judgment on their ratification theory
and were thus awarded approximately $400,000 for royalty accrued from
the effective date of ratification—the day the Merrimans brought the
claim.187
London appealed, arguing that the non-unitization clause (perhaps bet-
ter described as an anti-entireties clause), expressly prevented the Mer-
178. See, e.g., LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 667 (wherein London is used as an exam-
ple of nonparticipating interests and their effects on pools).
179. London, 756 S.W.2d at 738. The case does not provide the acreage of lease. I
believe it to be in the three-digit range as the NPRI owner’s royalty was included in a
Railroad Commission pooling order for a 640-acre gas unit, indicating that Merrimans’




182. Id. at 740.
183. Id. at 738.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 738–39.
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rimans from receiving royalty on production from any land other than the
western tract.188 The court of appeals, relying on Ruiz and Montgomery,
held that this clause did not prevent the pooling of the Merrimans’ inter-
est across both tracts.189 The court instead concluded: “The purported
non-unitization clause simply provides that no pooling or unitization of
royalties is intended ‘merely from’ the inclusion of the two tracts in one
lease. We agree that no such pooling results merely because the lease in-
cluded two tracts.”190 Then, pointing back at the pooling clause found
earlier in the lease, the court of appeals found language whereby the
lessee could pool or unitize “in any fashion” and which was not impinged
on in any way by the non-unitization clause.191 The court further held
that, although the Merrimans were not bound by any pooling without
their consent, they had ratified the pooling of their royalty interest by
filing suit in 1983 and were entitled to royalty from that date.192 This rati-
fication resulted in pooling.193
It is striking in London that, while the anti-entireties clause prevented
application of any apportionment presumption, it strangely did not mod-
ify the ability of the NPRI owner to have his interest apportioned across
both tracts when he was judicially determined to have ratified the lease
with his lawsuit.194 This was allowed even though the pooling clause was
never exercised.195 Essentially, the NPRI holder not only ratified the
lease by filing suit but also pooled his interest, even though the pooling
clause allowed only the lessee to pool the premises and only after filing a
unit designation.196 Why the NPRI owner was apparently allowed to both
ignore the express terms of the pooling clause while still utilizing the
pooling clause and to ignore the anti-entireties clause so that the NPRI
could be apportioned across both tracts in a fashion not available to the
lessee was left unexplained.
6. MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo
The fortuitous position in the eyes of Texas oil and gas jurisprudence of
an NPRI owner was further emphasized in MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, in which
an NPRI owner not only was allowed to ratify (or not ratify) after the
completion of wells but also was allowed to ratify part of his interest
where it benefited him and to disallow ratification of a portion of his
interest where it did not.197 In 1964, Palermo conveyed by warranty deed




192. Id. at 741.
193. Id. at 740.
194. See id. at 740–41.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 741. Merriman had, however, previously gotten a pooling order from the
Railroad Commission of his royalty interest. Id. at 738.
197. MCZ Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 53–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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a 150-acre tract in Brazos County, Texas (the Triolo Tract) to D.M. Triolo
and M.J. Triolo (collectively or singly, Triolo). Palermo’s deed to Triolo
reserved a 1/16th NPRI.198
In 1976, Triolo and his wife, as lessors, executed an oil, gas, and min-
eral lease (the “Triolo Lease”) of the entire tract to Amalgamated
Bonanza Oil Company, Ltd., reserving a 1/8th [lessor’s] royalty. . .
[t]he lease granted to the lessee the right to pool the land in accor-
dance with terms set out. The lease was eventually acquired by ap-
pellant MCZ, Inc. (“MCZ”).
In 1980, Mrs. Palermo conveyed her entire reserved interest in the
[Triolo] tract to appellant, Roy L. Turner, Trustee.
By a “Designation of Pooled Oil Unit,” dated August 17, 1981,
MCZ pooled 27.06 acres of the Triolo Tract to form the Philipello Oil
Unit No. 1 (the ‘Philipello Unit’).
Turner signed an instrument entitled “Pooling Agreement,” dated
May 3, 1982, which recited that Turner was the owner of a[n NPRI]
in the described tract and further stated:
“Whereas, such unit includes 27.06 acres out of the above de-
scribed 150.00 acre tract, and the said Roy L. Turner, Trustee, to the
extent expressly set forth herein, is willing to have such 27.06 acres
out of said 150.00 acres included in and pooled with said unit;
Now Therefore, Roy L. Turner, trustee, does hereby Grant, Lease
and Consent unto Prodeco Oil & Gas Company Ltd., and Gulf Oil
Corporation the right to so pool said 27.06 acres within said Unit,
PROVIDED that this Grant, Lease and Consent does not apply to
all or any portion of said 150.00 acre tract that is not included within
said 27.06 acre tract.”199
A producer was completed “on a portion of the Philipello Unit other
than the 27.06 acres included from the Triolo tract.”200 “Thereafter, on
August 3, 1982, MCZ pooled the remaining 123.8 acres of the Triolo tract
into the M.J. Triolo Unit No. 1 (the ‘Triolo Unit’).”201 Then a producer
was brought in “on the Triolo Unit within the acreage of the Triolo tract.
As operator of both wells, MCZ paid Turner for his interest in production
from both units.”202
In early 1983, Triolo advised MCZ that Triolo believed “that Turner’s
acceptance of royalty payments for production from the Philipello Unit
on acreage not owned by Turner constituted ratification by Turner of the
pooling provisions of the Triolo lease, and that such ratification author-
ized the pooling of Turner’s interest in the Triolo Unit as well.”203 There-
fore, Triolo demanded that he be credited “with a royalty interest of
198. Id.
199. Id. at 50–51.
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0.0483938, rather than the royalty interest of 0.0342875 that MCZ had
credited to Triolo in a division order.”204
Turner, on the other hand, claimed he refused to ratify the Triolo Unit
and demanded he receive a full 1/16th of the production from the well
located upon the Triolo Unit.205 Triolo thereafter brought suit to deter-
mine the royalty rights.206 The court held that because Triolo’s ratifica-
tion of the pooling was limited to the portion of the Triolo tract that was
included in the Philipello Unit, Turner was entitled to royalty on the en-
tire production from the well on the Triolo tract.207 The result is fascinat-
ing: through creative partial ratification of its interest and the court’s
recognition of same, the NPRI owner managed to retain royalty from the
well on his tract and acquire royalty from proceeds on the off-tract well
on acreage pooled with his own.208 This extension of the NPRI owner’s
power to allow selective ratification resulted in Turner receiving “1/16th ×
27.06/160 of the Philipello Unit’s production in addition to a full 1/16th of
production from the Triolo Unit, thereby reducing Triolo’s own interest”
in both units.209
The court of appeals did not see this as a case of partial or selective
ratification, but rather as two distinct acts by others, one of which Turner
had ratified and one he had not.210 In order to force Turner to fully ratify
the Philipello Unit with its entire NPRI, the court believed, it would be
necessary to view the formation of the two separate pooling units that
each contained portions of the entire Triolo tract as a single event or op-
eration, a leap it found contrary to the facts.211
IV. THE PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE IN TEXAS
A. COMMUNIZATION/UNITIZATION AND RATIFICATION
JURISPRUDENCE NOW
The present state of nonexecutive ratification of oil and gas leases in
Texas began with community leasing cases. The first trio, Parker, French,
and Veal, provided that absent language to the contrary in a community
lease, royalties are to be apportioned on an acreage-pro-rata basis, no
matter where production is achieved on the lease.212 French, perhaps the
most well-known of the cases, specifically provided that royalties within a
lease signed in counterpart should be divided among all lessors—even if




207. Id. at 53.
208. See id.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472, 476 (Tex. 1942); French v. George, 159
S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1942, writ ref’d); Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303,
305 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1940, writ ref’d).
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the proportion that their acreage bears to the total acreage of a multi-
tract lease.213 The Brown v. Smith opinion introduced an NPRI to the
multi-tract community leasing cases and precluded executives from ap-
plying voluntary pooling clauses to freestanding royalty—a crucial hold-
ing.214 Southland Royalty cemented Parker and French in Texas
jurisprudence, affirming that absent express agreement, a community
lease unitizes the multiple tracts therein so that production from any one
tract maintains the lease.215
Two decades later, the cases turned from limiting executive power over
NPRIs to expanding both the power of those same nonexecutives and the
timing and methodology of ratification. First, Montgomery allowed an
NPRI owner to choose whether an entireties clause in a lease could oper-
ate as to the NPRI and deemed ratification of the NPRI to have occurred
when the royalty owner filed suit.216 Then, Ruiz allowed a ratifying NPRI
on a nonproducing tract within a community lease and without an entire-
ties clause to avoid application of the non-apportionment rule.217 Brown
v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc. reinforced that no authority to pool an NPRI
was left with the executive or its lessee and that an NPRI owner on a well
tract did not have to ratify a lease but instead could collect a non-appor-
tioned share of the royalty.218 Three years later, in Verble, a court found
ratification by a non-well tract NPRI owner constituted an offer to pool
the NPRI across the entire leased tract notwithstanding an anti-entireties
clause in the lease.219 In 1988, London echoed this finding, while curi-
ously allowing the non-well tract NPRI owner to utilize the pooling
clause generally (while ignoring some of the more specific terms of the
pooling clause) and to avoid application of the anti-entireties clause so
the non-well tract freestanding royalty could be apportioned across the
entire lease.220 Finally, MCZ, Inc. introduced the idea of partial or selec-
tive ratification by the freestanding royalty and expanded the actions that
qualify as constructive ratification.221
After Verble and London, NPRIs in Texas were removed from cover-
age by the doctrine of non-apportionment.222 Further, the use of anti-
entireties clauses was significantly diminished in leases with pooling
213. French, 159 S.W.2d at 569.
214. Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46–47 (Tex. 1943).
215. Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex.
1952).
216. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213–15 (Tex. 1968).
217. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
218. Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc., 626 S.W.2d 810, 812, 813 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1981, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
219. Verble v. Coffman, 680 S.W. 2d 69, 70 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, no writ).
220. London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1988, writ denied).
221. MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 52, 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
222. See London, 756 S.W.2d at 741.
278 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
clauses to alleviate the hassles associated with title examination and roy-
alty payments on multi-tract leases with ununiform development.
Practically, the above process has led step-by-step to a situation in
which freestanding royalty interests like NPRIs, net profit interests, or
depending on the pooling clause, perhaps even overriding royalty inter-
ests that encumber all or a portion of a lease can wait on the sidelines
while development occurs and then possibly ratify the lease. The negative
effect of this opportunistic ratification of leases is illustrated by the fol-
lowing example. Consider a lease covering 320 acres encumbered by a 1/
16 NPRI on the west half and a separate 1/16 NPRI on the east half of the
leased acreage. Under current Texas jurisprudence, if a well is brought on
a spacing unit covering all of the west 160 acres, the owner of the well-
tract NPRI probably will not ratify the lease, while the owner of the east-
half NPRI will ratify the lease. While it might seem logical that the well
will only be encumbered by a 1/16 NPRI (the NPRI covering the west
half), the ratification by the east-half NPRI owner will result in the les-
sor’s royalty bearing the 1/16 west-half NPRI and an apportioned share of
the 1/16 east-half NPRI.223 After London, this is apparently true even if
the lease contains an anti-entireties clause.224 The question of who pays
this “extra” royalty and the notification and payment logistics attendant
thereto could be another source of tension between the lessor and the
lessee.225
B. A CAUTIONARY TALE
While the NPRI’s advantaged position may not matter if the lessee
seeks ratification before exploration and production occurs, if the inter-
ests are small enough not to substantially impact the economics of devel-
opment, or if the size of the lease is comparable to the size of spacing
units around the wells on the lease (as in almost all of the cases described
above), circumstances could arise in which a perverse application of the
above case law could warp lease ratification jurisprudence in pathological
directions. Indeed, it is easy to visualize a scenario where a large tract of
land with small NPRIs embedded in it could challenge current ratification
jurisprudence. For example, imagine a large ranch in southern Texas that
grew as the owners acquired surrounding land piecemeal. Some of these
acquired tracts are burdened by NPRIs. Later leases on the ranch provide
that the respective lessors will not be paid on the basis of any of lessor’s
percentage of ownership across the entire leased ranch but rather will be
paid on a “tract basis” in accordance with the percentage of undivided
interest that particular family member owns in a particular producing
tract. The leases expressly provide they will be split into multiple inde-
223. In the above example, acreage apportionment would be calculated as 1/16 x 160/
320, or 1/32.
224. See London, 756 S.W.2d at 739–40.
225. In practice, like NPRIs generally, this “extra” NPRI is typically deducted from the
lessor’s royalty until none remains. Any remaining NPRI is then deducted from the lessee’s
share.
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pendent leases as individual spacing units are formed around a producing
well.
At this point, the NPRI owner files of record ratifications of the leases
that expressly provide that the NPRI owner agrees to be subject to all the
terms of the leases. What will be the result? Modern ratification jurispru-
dence in Texas suggests that the NPRI owner can ratify the leases and
choose to be subject to the terms of the leases. Here, however, the terms
of the leases mean that no part of the NPRI is in any production unit.
Therefore, per the terms of royalty payment in the leases, none of the
royalty derived from any production unit should be paid to any party with
no interest in the production unit—including the NPRI owner.
This litigation highlights one variety of NPRI ratification dispute the
future might hold for Texas: large leases burdened by small nonexecutive
interests that, in turn, are located miles away from any production unit.
The size of the leases, the complexity of title, and the seeming clarity of
the lease terms with regard to the apportionment of royalties only among
parties owning interests in productive spacing units make application of
prior case law, as argued for by the NPRI owner, challenging and unsuita-
ble. It also highlights just the kind of mercenary ratifications that could be
avoided by making nonexecutive interests subject to pooling clauses exe-
cuted by executives.
V. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS
The evolution of NPRI ratification of multi-tract leases and pooled
units in Texas has advanced down an increasingly peculiar road, out of
step with sounder jurisprudence in other states familiar with oil and gas
law. Finally, litigation emerged which, before settled, both challenged the
status quo to its fundamentals and highlighted the need to reexamine the
relationship of NPRIs with their executives, with regard to ratifications of
multi-tract leases and pools.
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL FAULT LINES AND POOLING
An inconsistency arises when the non-apportionment rule is compared
to the Texas rule on community leases. In Texas, absent lease terms to the
contrary, the owners of the separate tracts leased in a community lease
share royalty from any production on the lease by reason of the rule of
construction in French.226 Under the Texas rule of non-apportionment,
however, a lessor who assigns a portion of a leased tract will not take part
in royalty derived from production from that portion unless the lease con-
tains an entireties clause.227 Thus, seemingly inconsistent results are pos-
sible where royalty is apportioned in a single lease in the first instance but
not the second.
226. French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1942, writ ref’d).
227. 2 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW § 521.4 (2019).
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Resolving the conflicting results of these two rules involves divining
motives. The inconsistency could possibly be rationalized by noting that
non-apportionment arises because of the conveyance subsequent to leas-
ing, whereas a community lease arises because multiple lessors of differ-
ent tracts sign one lease. In the community lease situation, Texas courts
view all parties (all lessors and the lessee) as intending apportionment
(pooling).228 Regarding the partial conveyance of a leased mineral inter-
est, the lessee is almost certainly not a party to the conveyance and,
therefore, has not consented to an apportionment of royalties that may
create additional royalty burdens. Texas courts view the parties to the
leased mineral conveyance as intending non-apportionment.229 Of
course, absent clear language of intent, what the parties really intended in
either situation is generally conjecture. In any event, community lease
apportionment has always provided an uneasy contrast to the non-appor-
tionment doctrine.
A fundamental disconnect of definitions and the accepted extent of
each of the sticks of the mineral estate also lies at the heart of allowing
lease ratification by nonexecutives in Texas as promulgated by French
and the aforementioned cases from the 1940s. Nonexecutive mineral in-
terest owners do not lease; leasing is left to the owner of the executive
right.230 The executive determines when royalties may begin and allows
for pooling.231 Despite this, executive power over application of certain
lease terms—pooling and unitization—can later reappear in the guise of
ratification of the lease by the royalty interest owner.232 Therefore, an
NPRI (or any nonexecutive interest) owner cannot lease its interest.233
Strangely, however, it can choose to allow—or not—certain terms of an
existing lease to affect the interest.
To further highlight the power of the executive, the executive can even
control the amount of royalty received by an NPRI holder when the
NPRI is of the “floating” variety. Not only do executives control when
royalties begin for NPRI owners but in the case of “floating” NPRIs, they
also control the extent of the royalties owed to the NPRI owner as a result
of the royalty terms negotiated in the lease.234 This is allowed because the
executive is constrained by its duty to the nonexecutives.235 Despite this
protection, under current Texas jurisprudence, the floating NPRI owner
228. See id. § 521.2.
229. See id.
230. Hlavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412, 421 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2003, pet. denied).
231. See 1 TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.6 (2019).
232. See Lee Jones, Jr., Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 572 (1948).
233. See id. at 599.
234. A “floating” NPRI is necessarily dependent on the executive, as the NPRI fraction
is multiplied by whatever lessor’s royalty is found in the existing oil and gas lease covering
the captioned land. For more on fixed vs. floating NPRIs, see generally Kulander, supra
note 19.
235. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984).
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can still choose to allow—or not allow—certain terms of an existing lease
to affect the extent of the royalty accrued from production.
Turning from the executive right to the lease-granted authority to exer-
cise voluntary pooling, a lessee seeks pooling authority from the lessor
because the lessor is the repository of development rights. The NPRI, in
contrast, has no development rights associated with it, so no need exists
(but for Texas law) to involve it in development decisions. As with the
lessor, once the lease is granted and pooling or unitization powers are
conferred on its lessee, the lessee is free to exercise the authority so long
as it acts prudently (or in “good faith”).236 The same sort of relational
duty could protect the NPRI without giving it a capricious veto power or
the ability to pounce with a lease ratification and a demand for royalty
based on dubious title claims upon a lessee’s bringing in production at a
location potentially miles away. The lessee should be able to pool on be-
half of the NPRI, without its consent or approval but with the same pro-
tections afforded to the NPRI as to lessors that the lessee must act
prudently when making pooling and unitization decisions.
If the NPRI ratification rulings described above, such as Brown v.
Getty Reserve Oil, Inc. (1981), Verble (1984), and London (1988), were
released before the development of the good-faith pooling requirement,
then the rulings expanding the rights of NPRI owners may have been
thought to be a way to protect the nonexecutive’s rights from manipula-
tive pooling by the executive. But good-faith pooling cases largely ante-
dated the ratification rulings; an implied requirement that the lessee
exercise good faith in making the determination to pool was established
in Texas decades earlier.237 Although there is some overlap in the timing
of the NPRI ratification cases and the later good-faith pooling cases in
Texas—and good-faith pooling jurisprudence continues to mature—given
the good-faith pooling requirement, it is not necessary to transform
NPRIs into a hybrid, partial participating interest to provide the NPRI
owner with adequate protection from improper pooling by the executive.
B. LEASE SIZE MATTERS
An examination of the progression of facts and opinions arising from
the cases that ricocheted down the calendar, from Parker in 1940 to
MCZ, Inc. in 1986, highlights an evolution of factors that gradually estab-
lished the NPRI owners in an advantaged spot.238 First, the cases consid-
ered the effect of entireties clauses on ratification, then the effect of
instances in which no entireties clauses were present, and finally the ef-
fect of an anti-entireties clause. Second, the acreages involved in the cases
236. See generally LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 310–23.
237. See, e.g., Banks v. Mecom, 410 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1966, writ
ref’d n.r.e.); Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1957, no writ).
238. See generally Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1940, writ
ref’d); MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
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largely fell in the three-digit range—none much bigger than a gas spacing
unit.
Applying prior NPRI ratification jurisprudence lockstep to a tract so
much larger introduces practical problems for lessees. The exact state of
title across such an enormous space can be very difficult, expensive, and
time-consuming to ascertain, particularly if the leased acreage partially
burdened by NPRI tracts was acquired piecemeal starting over a century
ago.239 Determining what each ratifying NPRI owner could possibly re-
ceive under the old approach could take far longer than a developer
could afford to wait. Being forced to respond to the opportunistic behav-
ior of NPRI owners, which the old Texas jurisprudence allows, could
place lessees in a position stacked against the prudence and caution that
industry custom and practice requires of them, particularly when the time
for development is short and title is complex. The timing of lease acquisi-
tion, exploration, and development is highly dependent on prices and
other variables, and companies quickly lease large tracts of land in order
to establish acreage positions from which to conduct exploration activi-
ties, such as seismic and well logging. Conducting complex title examina-
tion over leased tracts of land in an effort to identify every NPRI and
other nonexecutive interest (overriding royalties, etc.) that might be en-
tirely or partially covered is incompatible with the speed at which opera-
tors must typically conduct exploration and production activities, both for
business and for acting as a reasonably prudent operator—as, after all,
their leases require it.240
One response to the impact of old lease ratification case law on opera-
tions proposed on large tracts might be proposing a scheme whereby the
royalty paid to every NPRI owner is fluid depending on the size of the
NPRI relative to the eventual size of the leased acreage once all the title
work is completed. Such a fluid “pay deck” is not in any way compatible,
however, with the usual custom and practice of a typical producer’s land,
division order, and revenue departments. Furthermore, such a scheme
would likely result in overpayment of royalties that would be difficult or
impossible for an operator to recoup even through suit.
Similar arguments can be made for apportionment of overriding roy-
alty interests (ORIs). For example, if a lessee of a 5,000-acre lease carves
out a one percent overriding royalty interest covering only a 40-acre spac-
ing unit that it conveys to a geologist or investor in the well, that ORI
should not thereafter be apportioned over the entire lease. Again, like all
nonexecutive interests, the ORI is due a duty of consideration by the ex-
ecutive but with the complicating factor that it is derived from and paid
out of the lessee’s fee simple determinable interest and the proceeds de-
rived from the same.241 In addition, in many instances, the ORI owner
must rely on the lessee’s obligations to its lessor to protect and police the
239. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 683, 686.
240. See id. at 680–85.
241. See SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 12, at 154.
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ORI owner’s interests. Usually these interests will coincide, but where
they do not, the ORI owner can fall back on case law for protection
against executive or lessor and lessee overreach.242
As a matter of public policy, allowing an NPRI owner who ratified a
lease to be paid on a community-wide or unit-wide basis—despite con-
trary terms of the lease that provide that all parties to the lease will be
paid royalty on a tract basis—would encourage litigation elsewhere by
NPRI owners claiming they should have been paid on a community-wide
or unit-wide basis instead of on a tract basis. As the NPRI burden on the
royalty increases, the motivation for leasing decreases—Why expend the
time and effort to exercise the executive right to lease when someone else
rakes in the money? This dampening effect has been recognized in law
before: on relinquishment land in Texas, surface-owning agents for the
state are not permitted to spinoff royalty interests that might affect future
leasing because the General Land Office and the courts recognize that
this could retard the leasing of state minerals in the future.243 Further, as
more NPRI owners are due money, the lessee’s bookkeeping becomes
more challenging. The state’s public policy of encouraging the develop-
ment of oil and gas interests would be promoted by lessening the poten-
tial obstruction to development created by opportunistic ratifications by
nonexecutive interests.
Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, allowing the owner of an
NPRI located miles away from the proration unit for a particular well to
later ratify the lease and participate on a community-wide basis would
make the title work necessary for accurate calculation and correct and
timely payment of royalty extremely costly and difficult, if not impossible,
for lessee/producers to conduct. This would, in turn, curtail mineral devel-
opment and slow royalty payment.
C. OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND COMMENTARY
Louisiana courts have long held that the owner of a mineral servitude
has the power to pool on behalf of the owner of a mineral royalty.244
Case law on the issue is “almost nonexistent” outside Louisiana, Texas,
and now West Virginia,245 probably because of the existence of compul-
sory pooling statutes in other states.246 A smattering of opinions includes
dicta supporting joinder of parties having non-operating interests in pro-
242. See, e.g., Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. v. Petex, Inc., 1 P.3d 909, 919–20 (Kan.
2000).
243. See, e.g., Lewis v. Oates, 195 S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tex. 1946) (“[Selling freestanding
royalty interests that affect future leases] reduces or tends to reduce, leasing income in that
it takes away a part of the incentive fixed to encourage leasing of the land. It sets at naught
the legislative plan formulated for the purposes above indicated. According to the law as
stated in [Greene], it ignores the basis fixed to accomplish those purposes.” (emphasis
omitted)).
244. Le Blanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 88 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1956).
245. 6 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 227, § 925.1.
246. See id. § 905.1.
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duction.247 For example, in Carroll v. Caldwell, the Supreme Court of
Illinois suggested that the joinder of both the owner of leasehold working
interest and the owner of an overriding royalty interest in the same land
was necessary to combine their interests under a unitization agreement,
noting, “[e]ach had a right to determine if unitization should be at-
tempted and a converse power of withholding agreement to it.”248
Recently, the Supreme Court of West Virginia considered the same
question in Gastar Exploration, Inc. v. Contraguerro.249 In the case, PPG
Industries, Inc. (PPG) granted a lease covering multiple tracts to Gastar
Exploration USA, Inc. (Gastar), including a 105.9-acre tract burdened
with NPRIs.250 Later, Gastar voluntarily pooled 700 acres from this lease,
including the 105.9 acres, with other leases creating a unit called the
Wayne/Lily Unit.251 Gastar did not seek consent from any NPRI owners
before creating the unit, but later on, it sought ratification after unit for-
mation.252 The NPRI owners in the 105.9-acre tract refused to ratify the
unit.253
With the disputed royalties in suspense, the NPRI owners filed suit
against Gastar and PPG in the trial court of Marshall County, both seek-
ing the suspended royalties and arguing that PPG could not have given
Gastar the right to pool the 105.9 acres with other acreage without con-
sent from the NPRI owners.254 The trial court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the NPRI owners and held that the pooling provi-
sion in the captioned lease (and the resulting unit) were nullities until the
NPRI owners consented to the pooling.255 In support of its holding, the
court cited Texas case law stating that pooling effected a cross-convey-
ance of affected interests; the NPRIs were being conveyed to and among
the other owners in the unit without consent.256 Not surprisingly, PPG
and Gastar sought appellate review.
The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed and held that West Virginia
law does not effectuate a cross-conveyance of pooled royalty interests.257
Instead, the supreme court noted that West Virginia case law determined
that pooling merely amalgamates the financial and contractual compo-
nents of the pooled interests but does not affect cross-conveyances of
those interests.258 Crucial to rejecting application of the cross-conveyance
theory, the supreme court noted that its adoption would effectively give
247. Id. § 925.1.
248. 147 N.E.2d 69, 74 (Ill. 1957).
249. 800 S.E.2d 891, 893–94 (W. Va. 2017).
250. Id. at 895.
251. Id.




256. Id. at 896–97.
257. Id. at 900–01.
258. Id.
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executive rights back to nonexecutive owners.259 This reversal meant that
a lease covering land burdened by NPRIs could be pooled without the
consent or ratification of the NPRI owners.260
Louisiana and West Virginia provide superior jurisprudence to that
found in Texas. Nearly all leases provide for voluntary pooling. An execu-
tive, acting in good faith, should be able to pool on behalf of nonexecu-
tive mineral or royalty owners. The Williams & Meyers treatise agrees,
opining:
Little reason appears to support the Texas view that the executive,
acting in good faith, may determine all lease provisions save one,
whether the land should be pooled or unitized. . . . The self-interest
of the executive can usually be trusted to protect the royalty owner
from unwise or inappropriate pooling clauses . . . . The Louisiana
position gives the executive the power he needs to procure a lease in
many instances and facilitates the accomplishment of socially desira-
ble ends of pooling and unitization.261
Another commentator has suggested that courts may simply have a “pa-
ternalistic” attitude towards NPRI owners.262 For instance, in Brown v.
Smith, the court explained its position by pointing out that pooling effec-
tuates a cross-conveyance by each lessor and could dissipate the owner-
ship interest of the NPRI owner.263 Similarly, in Ruiz, the court may have
wanted to prevent subjecting the NPRI owner’s acreage to a lease main-
tained by production from an off-tract well.264 While the mere difference
in jurisprudence regarding the cross-conveyance theory of pooled inter-
ests between Texas and West Virginia may seem to have driven the opin-
ion, the underlying bedrock of Gastar Exploration, Inc. lies in the court’s
recognition of the notion that nonexecutives have no power to make ex-
ecutive decisions: a phenomenon that lies beyond whether a particular
jurisdiction applies the cross-conveyance theory or not.265
Another path of reform runs through the Texas legislature. A robust
compulsory pooling statute would alleviate the NPRI ratification morass
that case law has provided. Under a properly worded compulsory pooling
statute, like in Oklahoma,266 for example, a qualified party seeking
forced pooling would be able to include NPRIs in the pool and not have
to worry about separate questions of ratification. However, betting on the
Texas legislature to quickly and correctly expand compulsory pooling au-
thority is not a safe wager. A more realistic approach might involve a
statute simply allowing lessors to subject NPRIs to the voluntary pooling
authority common to oil and gas leases. The definitional lever for such a
259. Id. at 900.
260. Id. at 901.
261. 6 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 227, § 925.1.
262. Lynch, supra note 5, at 2.
263. Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. 1943).
264. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 842–43 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
265. See Gastar Exploration, Inc. v. Contraguerro, 800 S.E.2d 891, 900 (W. Va. 2017).
266. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.1 (West 2019).
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bill—necessary to simplify esoteric concepts for harried state politicians
unfamiliar with a byzantine area of law like oil and gas—would be the
executive right itself. Such a law would allow only the holder of the exec-
utive right attributable to a mineral interest and any nonexecutive inter-
ests carved from that mineral interest, such as NPRIs, to allow a lessee to
voluntarily pool that mineral interest and all nonexecutive interests
carved from that mineral interest. Legislation prohibiting NPRI owners
from picking and choosing what to ratify and what not to ratify might
work but could be difficult to draft because of the complexities of defin-
ing what qualifies as ratification, partial ratification, and so on, as well as
what time limits, if any, should be placed on ratifications relative to dis-
covery by the NPRI owner of the leasing and attempted pooling of their
nonexecutive interests.
D. THE EXECUTIVE RIGHT BALL-AND-CHAIN
While courts in Texas have progressively extended the fortuitous posi-
tion of NPRI owners, Texas oil and gas jurisprudence has empowered
nonexecutive interests in other ways. For example, the executive or its
lessee almost certainly has some duty to notify nonexecutives of their
right to ratify community leases or pooling agreements, particularly if the
executive has some knowledge of the identity and location of the nonex-
ecutive.267 In Friddle v. Fisher, the plaintiff acquired NPRIs that entitled
him to 3/4 royalty in production from an 84.7-acre tract.268 In 1998, de-
fendants, who owned the underlying mineral estate, executed an oil and
gas lease providing for a 1/8 royalty and containing a standard pooling
clause.269 The executive did not notify the plaintiff of the execution of the
lease, the subsequent pooling of the leased acreage with an adjacent tract,
or the drilling of a producing well on the adjacent pooled tract.270 When
the plaintiff learned these facts, he brought suit, and the court stated that
if the holder of an executive right knows the identity and location of the
holder of an NPRI, the executive’s duty includes an obligation to notify
the owner of the NPRI of a lease and of a pooling declaration or other
agreement that may affect the NPRI owner’s rights.271 This duty to notify
would be very burdensome after generational transfers: What due dili-
gence must the executive perform?
The duty of an executive to nonexecutive interest owners has likewise
been expanded. An executive owes a duty of good faith to the nonexecu-
267. While the Texas Supreme Court has not gone so far as to require the holder of the
executive rights to search the official public records to determine the name and address of
all the NPRI owners, the court has made clear that if the executive knows the name and
location of an NPRI owner, “it [is] their duty to notify him of the lease amendment and
account to him for his share of the payment as received.” Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d
638, 641 (Tex. 1967).
268. 378 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied).
269. Id. at 478–79.
270. Id. at 479.
271. Id. at 482.
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tive.272 Depending on the jurisdiction, the scope of this duty ranges from
a duty of utmost good faith to a fiduciary duty.273 In re Bass found the
Texas Supreme Court at first ruling that no duty to lease encumbered an
executive and that no executive duty generally existed before leasing oc-
curred.274 Later, the court held that the executive right is exercised—and
the duty to the nonexecutive invoked—whenever the executive does (or
does not do) something that affects the value of a nonexecutive’s es-
tate.275 While the supreme court refused to establish a general rule that
the executive is liable for any refusal to lease, it did establish that a re-
fusal by the executive to lease that stemmed from arbitrary self-dealing
could be actionable.276 While nonexecutive mineral owners and NPRI
owners own very distinct interests and are potentially affected differently
by the leasing activities of the executive right holder, both are nonexecu-
tive interests.277 In Lesley v. Veterans Land Board, explaining what the
executive’s fiduciary duty is, the supreme court opined, “We come now to
the principal issue[ ] in the case: the nature of the duty that the owner of
the executive right owes to the non-executive interest owner.”278 The
court made no express distinction between nonexecutive mineral owners
and NPRI owners, seemingly dispensing with any distinction in the fiduci-
ary duty between a nonexecutive mineral interest owner and an NPRI
owner.279
Combined with the incongruously favorable position an NPRI owner
seems to hold after the train of cases described above, Texas lessors are
now faced with a privileged class of nonexecutives to whom they hold a
fiduciary-like duty in an overall climate of falling royalties. Those NPRIs
may be miles from production and completely unknown until expansive
and arduous title work is complete. Fortunately, at least, a lessee owes no
duty to a nonexecutive unless it knowingly enters into an arrangement
deliberately structured in such a way as to benefit the executive at the
expense of the nonexecutive.280
E. NONEXECUTIVE RATIFICATION: AN OXYMORON
Once separated, as when an NPRI is severed, the executive right, un-
less limited by the terms of its creation, is not only complete and irrevoca-
ble in Texas, but also perpetual: the “executive right granted or reserved
to the holder, his heirs, successors and assigns is presumptively perpetual
272. See Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984).
273. See id.; Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1937).
274. 113 S.W.3d 735, 745 (Tex. 2003).
275. Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 487–88 (Tex. 2011).
276. Id. at 491.
277. Id. at 487.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 86 (Tex. 2015). It may still be
arguable, however, that the lessee might have a duty to notify owners of nonoperating
interests of their right to ratify community leases or pooling agreements if the lessee knows
that the holder of the executive right is profiting at the expense of the nonexecutive.
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and hence purports to allow the creation of interests in real property that
will vest at some indefinite time in the future.”281 In other words, the
nonexecutive interest owner retains none of the perpetual real property
estate that makes up the executive estate. How can the NPRI owner exer-
cise any executive control (like ratification) when he never had such abil-
ity to start?
When the Montgomery court surmised that application of either the
pooling or the entireties clause (or both) would “allow the holder of the
executive rights to either diminish or enlarge the ownership of that of the
royalty owner,”282 it inaccurately construed what pooling and unitization
actually does to royalty interests. The court also failed to consider the
duty owed by executives to nonexecutives and the requirement of good-
faith pooling. Pooling changes the spatial extent of a divided mineral or
royalty interest—and likely changes the amount of royalty owed to roy-
alty owners as the interest is apportioned across the pool—but it does not
change the fundamental properties of the interest.283 In any event, it is
the change in royalty revenue after pooling over which royalty owners
sue, not abstract notions of possible diminishment or enlargement of the
legal definition of the extent of their real property estate.
The mistakes continued. The Montgomery court seemed to confuse the
interest of a mineral cotenant and an NPRI when it opined:
We think that the non-participating royalty owner, so far as the exis-
tence of an option is concerned, occupies a comparable position to
that of a cotenant under a lease made by his cotenant or a non-par-
ticipating royalty owner under a pooling agreement made by the
holder of the executive rights.284
This is a basic error, and later cases—like London—that seem to have
propagated this thinking have compounded the mistake.NT1,FN=’314’>
First, obviously, mineral interest cotenants are fundamentally different
from NPRIs.285 Cotenants are separate fee interests, whereas freestand-
ing interests like NPRIs are carved from a mineral estate.286 Second,
nonexecutive interests simply do not participate in the self-development
or leasing of minerals—or accepting judicially conjured “offers” to create
community leases.287 When the London court opined that leases purport-
ing “to authorize the lessee to pool the royalty rights of the non-partici-
pating royalty interest owner with other royalty interest owners . . . is
281. RICHARD HEMINGWAY ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION § 2.2(C) (4th
ed. 2004).
282. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1968).
283. See French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1942, writ ref’d).
284. Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 214.
284. See London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 739 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied).
285. See Benjamin Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Problems in Allocation of Produc-
tion to Owners of Non-Participating Royalty Interests in the Era of Horizontal Drilling, 44
ST. MARY’S L.J. 771, 798–99 (2013).
286. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1995).
287. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 2.6(A)(1).
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essentially an offer by the lessor to the other royalty interest owners to
create a community lease by ratifying the lease,”288 it not only errone-
ously equated executive mineral-owning lessors to royalty owners but
also ascribed to nonexecutive royalty interests the ability to accept offers
to lease and, possibly, even to choose (by ratification) which terms to
accept, such as pooling and entireties clauses. Third, if NPRIs are funda-
mentally nonexecutive interests, how do they have the executive power to
ratify, or not ratify, pooling in the first place?
This paternalistic approach taken by Texas courts towards NPRI own-
ers is unnecessary to protect them from rapacious lessors and lessees. Re-
garding the former, the duty of the executive right adequately protects
nonexecutive interests; no further power need be retained by the NPRI
to protect it from action by the executive. With regard to the latter, ro-
bust case law in producing states already requires good-faith voluntary
pooling by lessees toward lessors.289 Allowing a lessor to give the lessee
pooling authority over the leased interests—including NPRIs derived
from the leased interest—will not abjure the lessee from the requirement
of good-faith pooling to the executive (who, in turn, owes a duty to the
nonexecutives) and will provide legal recourse if the standard is not met.
The author submits that a lease that purports to authorize the executive’s
lessee to pool the (nonexecutive) royalty rights of the NPRI owner with
other royalty interest owners does just that.
F. LEASE TERMS AND RATIFICATIONS
The above suggestions would fundamentally alter the relationship be-
tween lessors, lessees, and nonexecutive interests. While the author has
no illusions that such changes are likely in the near term, what should
happen within the boundaries of the current legal landscape?
1. Extent of Ratification
Within the current jurisprudence, the court in Brown v. Smith had it
correct: if an NPRI owner joins a lease, its interest should necessarily be
subjected to any pooling agreement in the lease.290 All terms within
leases ratified and assumed by NPRIs should be strictly applied to the
ratifying interests. If those leases provide for a production-unit-based
royalty allocation, the ratifying parties should be held to those terms.
Even if the NPRI interests are apportioned across the entirety of the
leases as a matter of law, if the terms of the leases expressly provide oth-
erwise, the terms of the ratified instrument should apply. This would
seem true especially if the nonexecutive interest owner expressly ratifies
288. London, 756 S.W.2d at 739 (citations omitted).
289. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 530–46 (containing a lengthy survey of case law
from various states that describes what constitutes evidence of good-faith and bad-faith
pooling and how to avoid the latter).
290. See Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. 1943).
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the lease and records that ratification in the official public record for the
notice of all third parties, including the lessee and its successors.
A number of the cases described above used in support of the theory of
communitized royalty across the entire leased acreage involved Pro-
ducer’s 88 forms.291 Such leases typically do not contain the extensive
tract-basis allocations more often found in lessor-drafted leases that cover
large tracts and may involve multiple undivided interests leasing across
the same described leasehold.292 In contrast to the form leases, leases
drafted by lessors—some of which approach a hundred pages in length—
commonly contain extensive and detailed provisions that are inconsistent
with the very basic provisions contained in Producer’s 88 forms or similar
forms drafted by lessees, making attempts by non-ratifying NPRI interest
owners to share in royalty on a lease-wide, communitized basis inappro-
priate.293 Consider the effect of an NPRI owner miles away from actual
production expressly ratifying one or more leases that contained one or
more of the following clauses (all of which are commonly found in lessor-
drafted leases that cover large tracts):
Payment of Royalty: Provisions that the royalties will be paid to each
mineral interest owner to the extent that the owner owns interest in
the actual production.
Production Units: Provisions that each production unit surrounding
any wells drilled on the leased acreage shall be a certain size, as
agreed or provided by state conservation regulation, depending on
whether the well is oil or gas. Similarly, provisions that allow lessee
to designate the smallest proration units.
Retained Acreage: Provisions that only productive tracts shall be held
into the secondary term by production in paying quantities from the
appropriate well.
Separate Lease: Provisions that each production unit is to be treated
as a separate lease.
Termination and Release: The lease terminates as to all lands covered
at the end of the primary term except for lands within a production
unit.
If an NPRI owner or other nonexecutive mineral interest owner ex-
pressly ratifies all of the terms of a lease or leases that contain such terms,
records that ratification, and then finds that the interest is not included in
production units, it seems preposterous that the NPRI owner can then
argue that those particular terms do not apply to its interest after ex-
pressly agreeing to have its interest governed by all of the terms. None of
291. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977 writ, ref’d
n.r.e.) and London, 756 S.W.2d at 739, mentioned use of Producer’s 88 forms, excerpted
lease provisions commonly included in Producer’s 88 leases, or both, in the description of
the backgrounds to their respective disputes. It is likely some of the other cases involved
similar form leases, but the opinions in those cases do not make it clear.
292. London, 756 S.W.2d at 740 n.3.
293. See id.
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these provisions are commonly included in a typical two-page, lessee-
drafted oil and gas lease, such as the various Producer’s 88 forms promul-
gated over the years, which are found at issue in the cases described
above. As the court noted in London, “[b]ecause of its pooling clause, the
standard form Producer’s 88 lease . . . is ill-equipped to handle the com-
plexities inherent in multi-tract and multi-royalty situations.”294
This picking and choosing of what lease terms the nonexecutive inter-
est owner will ratify descends to nonsensical depths if one goes another
step and considers the situation (as seen in the large-lease ligation de-
scribed above) of an owner of multiple NPRIs within one large lease
(possibly a community lease) or a pool of leases. As we have seen, NPRI
owners on non-well tracts ratify leases (to get apportioned royalties in-
stead of nothing),295 while NPRI owners on well tracts do not ratify
leases (to get unapportioned royalties instead of apportioned royal-
ties).296 What if the same party owns both NPRIs in the same community
lease or pool of leases? Can the NPRI owner choose which interest rati-
fies? Even though it seems remarkably opportunistic to allow such a ploy,
the identity of the owner of a particular NPRI relative to other NPRIs
seems not make a difference under the current state of Texas law.
2. Ratification Status and Timing
Another step to consider beyond selective ratification among an inven-
tory of NPRIs owned by one party in a lease is whether or not an NPRI
owner can change the status of a particular ratification. It appears that an
NPRI owner could ratify at any time, meaning that if the first production
unit covers all or a portion of its NPRI, an NPRI owner likely won’t ratify
now but will later if the production from the lease shifts off the extent of
its NPRI.297 The reverse of this process is only possible if revocation of a
lease ratification is allowed. Because ratification necessarily recognizes a
lease as a conveyance in Texas and revocation is a statement saying that
an agreement or contract is no longer in effect, it follows that a mere
revocation should not reverse the conveyance of rights found in an un-
conditional ratification. Given the creeping ascendancy of the NPRIs’
power over pooling and other terms of a lease, however, revocation of
lease ratification could be lurking in future case law. For example, while a
court might not allow revocation in general, what if the NPRI holder rati-
fies but “reserves” the right to revoke prospectively? Is this a real prop-
erty right, and if so, what is its nature and extent?
Ratification is sometimes the result of a judicial opinion that arises
from other actions considered, in the circumstances, to be de facto ratifi-
cation as a matter of law for some other reason—not the result of express
294. London, 756 S.W.2d at 740 n.3.
295. See, e.g., Verble v. Coffman, 680 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, no writ).
296. See, e.g., Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc., 626 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1981, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
297. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tex. 1968) (holding
that ratification of the NPRI occurred when the royalty owner filed suit).
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adoption by the nonexecutive interest owner, such as the filing of a law-
suit in Montgomery.298 Although a less clear-cut situation than when all
the terms of a lease are expressly ratified and recorded, here, too, the
judicially ordered ratification should be considered to apply to all of the
terms of the lease. This will not only reflect that the ratifying interest is
truly nonexecutive and is either included in the terms of the lease (as is
properly done in Louisiana) or not (as is still found in Texas) but also
ease the interpretation of the ratification for the benefit of subsequent
title analysts.
The progression of case law in Texas has led to NPRI owners being
cagey about ratification and waiting for the outcome of wells in a pool to
be known before pulling the trigger—or not—on ratification. Case law in
Texas is murky about what, if any, time limits for ratification exist. One
opinion established that the right to ratify could be lost to laches after, in
that case, the passage of merely three years.299 On the other hand, in
Montgomery, the well located on the Crutchfield tract was completed in
October 1956, shut in, then put on production in May 1958.300 The dry
hole drilled on land pooled with the First Tract was plugged in 1961.301 By
the supreme court’s ruling, Montgomery ratified the lease on May 12,
1964.302 Rittersbacher might have successfully argued that Montgomery
should have ratified within a reasonable time, as Montgomery might have
then lost that right on the grounds of laches.303 Laches was not argued in
the case. By waiting to ratify, Montgomery was able to wait until a well
was drilled on the First Tract. If the well had been a much more prolific
producer than the well drilled on the Crutchfield tract, Montgomery
would not have ratified the entireties clause.
Any time limit, such as the statute of limitations, must have a beginning
point. Many times, NPRI owners are unaware of production on a particu-
lar lease and the spatial relationship of such production to their interests.
Is the spatial extent of pooled acreages “inherently undiscoverable” by
affected NPRI owners in such a way as to prevent the clock’s running
under the relevant statute of limitations? For example, in Montgomery,
prior to ratification, when Montgomery claimed to be unaware of the un-
authorized production, he lost any royalties paid on production from the
Crutchfield tract.304 Therefore, the timing of ratification may lead back to
the duty of executives to notify owners of nonoperating interests of their
right to ratify community leases or pooling agreements, even if the execu-
tive would rather let sleeping dogs lie.305 Without giving such notice, it
298. Id. at 214.
299. Nugent v. Freeman, 306 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App.—Eastland, 1957, writ ref. n.r.e.).
300. Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 212.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 215 (Calvert, J., dissenting).
303. See id.
304. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
305. See De Benavides v. Warren, 674 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (an executive’s duty requires notification be given to the nonexecutive of
the execution of a lease allowing for the creation of a pooled unit that may include the
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could be argued that the executive is prevented by estoppel from claiming
that the nonexecutive failed to ratify the pooling within a reasonable
time.306 In some cases, however, the nonexecutive will be placed on re-
cord notice by the recordation of pooling or even the recordation of a
lease with a pooling clause. Certain knotty factual situations may raise
questions of whether the nonexecutive had actual notice of the leasing
and pooling. What should the statute of limitations be in those situations?
The direction of case law in Texas suggests a forgiving attitude toward
NPRI owners, but should the NPRI owner be given a pass on “discover-
ing” a lease with a recorded pooling provision or a recorded pooling
when the NPRI owner actually knew—or should have known—of the
pooling? These litigious questions are mooted in a regime where an exec-
utive, acting with necessary regard toward the nonexecutives, may exe-
cute a lease granting pooling authority on behalf of royalty owners.
G. INTEREST CREATION AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES
Can opportunistic ratification by nonexecutive interests be entirely
avoided? Such a remedy may require a time machine for most, but when
a nonexecutive interest is created, the parties could specifically authorize
the executive to pool the property on the nonexecutive’s behalf, to exe-
cute a lease that contains an entireties clause, or both.307 The Texas Su-
preme Court, in Montgomery, suggested that if the executive wishes to
prevent the NPRI from potentially falling within the operation of an en-
tireties or pooling clause, the executive should take “affirmative steps” to
exclude the interest from the operation of an entireties or pooling
clause.308
1. Leasing and Lease Terms
Protective leasing measures may be helpful to lessors and lessees con-
cerned about opportunistic ratifications by freestanding royalty owners. If
title is known, separate leases could be taken on each tract over which the
royalty ownership varies with its neighbor(s). Of course, the state of title
may be unknown as to any varying degree of royalty burdens across the
desired acreage.309 In addition, smaller leases may not be large enough to
either individually permit drilling wells in spacing units that satisfy state
conservation laws or to prevent drainage across lease boundaries, and im-
plied covenant obligations may follow.310
nonexecutive interest). See generally Ernest E. Smith, The Standard of Conduct Owed by
Executive Right Holders and Operators to the Owners of Nonparticipating and Nonoperat-
ing Interests, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 241, 252–55 (1981).
306. Warren, 674 S.W.2d at 359–60 (nonexecutives were permitted to retroactively rat-
ify back to the date of first production—thirteen years before—in a unit that was later
dissolved seven years prior to ratification).
307. See Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 213.
308. Id.
309. LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 683.
310. See 2 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 9.1(A).
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Despite a footnote in London noting that one prominent commentator
had promoted the idea that “the lessor of a non-producing tract cannot
exclude the non-executive’s interest from a pooled unit without the non-
executive’s consent,”311 protective lease drafting measures may provide
solace—or at least provide evidence of intent when the litigation starts.
For example, the court in Standard Oil Co. v. Donald suggested that the
express exclusion of the mineral estate of other interest owners from the
lease could prevent the possibility of ratification or the execution of sepa-
rate leases.312 The French court held that royalties should be paid in the
proportion that any particular lessor’s acreage bears to the entire lease
but noted that the parties could certainly agree otherwise.313 Optimistic
executives have drafted pooling clauses expressly excepting any nonex-
ecutive from their coverage in the leased acreage.314 Despite the discour-
aging state of case law, hopeful practitioners may try drafting entirety
clauses for multi-tract leases that expressly provide that the lessor has not
apportioned royalties and that the lessee has no authority to do so.
Post-leasing, one way for lessees to protect themselves from opportu-
nistic NPRI ratification is to seek ratification before exploration and pro-
duction activities begin. This will allow the lessee/producer at least to
have an idea what of royalty burdens exist before making a final determi-
nation on whether to drill. Such a protective option may not be available,
however, if the royalty interests burdening a tract are unknown to the
lessee and lessor. This is a very real possibility if the leased tract is large,
the exact total extent of the leased acreage is unsure, and the NPRIs are
located far from the tract targeted for development. In such a circum-
stance, title to each interest over the entire leased region would have to
be examined and calculated, a potentially perilous and definitely expen-
sive and time-consuming task made impracticable by the economic reali-
ties of the business.315
Even if title and burdens across the entire leased tract are determined
with relative surety and the lessee has not yet lost its bargaining leverage
with NPRIs because it waited to drill until after seeking ratification, the
haggling now begins.316 “Ratify this lease,” the lessee demands. NPRI
owners on the drill tract refuse while those not on the drill tract rush to
ratify. “Ratify this lease, or I won’t drill, and no one gets royalties,” the
lessee demands again. The drill tract NPRIs may now acquiesce—or
311. London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 740 n.3 (Tex. App—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied) (citing Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a Fiduciary
Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. REV. 371, 391–95
(1985)).
312. Standard Oil Co. v. Donald, 321 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1959,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“No intention to communitize the royalties would have been manifested
had appellees excluded from the lease the mineral estate of the other parties, or had they
executed a separate lease . . . .”).
313. French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1942, writ ref’d).
314. Interview with Randall Sadler, Title Attorney & Managing Partner, Sadler Bieber
Law Grp. PLLC in Hous., Tex. (June 15, 2019).
315. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 22, at 683, 686.
316. See Holliday, supra note 285, at 794 n.147, 802.
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not—but this all takes time, the lease is possibly counting down to expira-
tion, and the lessor wants development now, possibly because of high
prices or drainage from the lease caused by proximal drilling.317
2. Allocation Wells
Many—if not most—oil and gas wells being drilled in Texas today are
horizontal wells.318 As such, the use of allocation wells may be considered
a way around the problem of pooling clauses and NPRI ratification woes,
although this confidence may be misplaced in some circumstances. Allo-
cation wells are horizontal wells that cross the boundary of two or more
unpooled leases where no agreement has been made as to how produc-
tion will be portioned.319 Allocation wells have some appeal as a means
of confronting opportunistic NPRI ratification because no representation
of pooling would need to be made.320
When considering a pool composed of several discrete leased tracts,
unleased minerals interests, and NPRIs within the pool but not in tracts
with any portion of a horizontal well (or in large tracts within the pool
that only contain a small portion of the horizontal well), those interests
will likely ratify the lease.321 If pooling never occurs, however, and the
horizontal well is instead drilled as an allocation well, there will be no
pooling to ratify and such non-drill tract interest owners would not par-
ticipate in the well.322 This phenomenon may prove favorable to lessors
and NPRI owners on the drill tracts that do not want the royalties appor-
tioned over an entire pool to include non-drill tract interest owners.
While allocation and production sharing agreement (PSA) wells323 may
seem like salvation regarding non-drill tract interests, such wells do come
with disadvantages that may limit their utility. Pooling allows for the divi-
sion of interests on a tract basis, whereas allocation and PSA wells derive
their payment obligations on a well-by-well basis.324 Further, absent pool-
ing, lessors have not bound themselves to the payment allocation formula
for pooled interests.325 This potentially leads to challenges of the lessee’s
allocation methodology. And, of course, allocation and PSA wells do not
317. See id. at 812 n.279.
318. See generally Bret Wells, Allocation Wells, Unauthorized Pooling, and the Lessor’s
Remedies, 68 BAYLOR L. REV., 1, 2 n.1 (2016).
319. Clifton A. Squibb, The Age of Allocation: The End of Pooling as We Know It?, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 929, 930 (2013).
320. Id. at 931.
321. Id. at 933.
322. Id. at 931.
323. A production sharing agreement is an agreement when the mineral interest
owner(s) and the lessee agree in writing on an allocation methodology for production from
a particular well, as that well relates to the tract in which the mineral interest owner(s)
owns an interest. 1 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 227, § 17.05. In contrast, an allocation
well involves no agreement with the mineral interest owner(s). Squibb, supra note 319, at
947.
324. Squibb, supra note 319, at 933.
325. Id.
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maintain non-drill-site leases, as pooling does.326
More generally, relying on allocation or PSA wells presents legal risks
simply because case law has not conclusively established that they are
even allowed under “typical” oil and gas leases.327 It is also unclear what
exactly a lessee must show to prove that its production allocation scheme
is reasonable so as to avoid lawsuits by interest owners who believe they
are being shortchanged.328
In some cases, allocation and PSA wells may not help in any event.
When considering one large lease, no property boundaries may end up
being crossed by a particular horizontal well.329 In such a circumstance,
no application for an allocation or PSA well is likely to be seen as neces-
sary. Indeed, the Railroad Commission will probably look askance at
such an application, as no lease boundaries would be crossed, and no
Rule 37, 38, or 86 exceptions would likely be necessary. Such a maneuver
might even suggest that the lessee or lessors were attempting to avoid
ratifications from NPRIs located a significant distance from the horizon-
tal well under a misbegotten notion of bad faith by the executive and his
lessee. Given the case law and the favorable treatment given to NPRI
owners described above, relying on allocation or PSA wells within a sin-
gle lease or community lease to avoid ratification of pooling clauses by
NPRI owners may be challenged by NPRI owners.
VI. CONCLUSION
Steps, both small and large, should be considered to improve the oper-
ation of law on nonexecutive interests. When an NPRI owner files ratifi-
cations of leases in which the NPRI owner expressly agrees to make its
NPRI subject to the terms of the leases, including terms providing for
tract-basis payment of royalty and clauses establishing separate leases for
each proration unit, the NPRI is subject to all terms of the ratified leases.
Judicial determinations that an NPRI owner has acted in a way to con-
structively ratify a lease should carry the same weight. If leases are
deemed community leases, they are communitized at the time of execu-
tion by the lessors and not later, when an NPRI owner within the leased
acreage files ratifications of said leases in the public property records.
Another small step would be requiring NPRI claimants for royalty to
prove dubious title assertions instead of just presenting speculative acre-
age calculations and expecting a check.
326. Id.
327. Andrew Zeve et al., PSA and Allocation Wells—The Current State of Play, EN-
ERGY LEGAL BLOG (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.energylegalblog.com/blog/2016/10/13/psa-
and-allocation-wells-%E2%80%93-current-state-play [https://perma.cc/UY93-CZ9J].
328. See id. For an idea of the conflicting views regarding the legal nature of allocation
and PSA wells, compare Wells, supra, note 318, with Ernest E. Smith, Applying Familiar
Concepts to New Technology: Under the Traditional Oil and Gas Lease, a Lessee Does Not
Need Pooling Authority to Drill a Horizontal Well That Crosses Lease Lines, 12 TEX J. OIL
GAS & ENERGY L. 1 (2017).
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Another step in the direction of sounder oil and gas jurisprudence will
avail itself the next time a Texas appellate court is asked to consider one
or more leases that, with unambiguous language, exclude from the cover-
age of the pooling powers granted in the lease any nonexecutive interest
within the leased acreage. In this circumstance, the author hopes the
court would recognize that the nonexecutive had no pooling power to
ratify in the lease. Although this might lead to a subsequent claim by the
nonexecutive that the executive had violated its duty of utmost good faith
and fair dealing by disallowing the NPRI from participating in pooling
and collecting royalty derived from non-tract production even if the
nonexecutive ratified the lease,330 it might also ultimately push Texas
courts to recognize that nonexecutive interests are, in fact, nonexecutive.
The fundamental failure that introduced the detrimental landscape re-
garding nonexecutive interests seen today in Texas is the inability of les-
sees to voluntarily pool NPRIs unless the severing instrument creating
the NPRI allows it.331 This permits nonexecutive interest owners to exer-
cise executive powers.332 Texas jurisprudence needs to recognize, as in
Louisiana and West Virginia, that nonexecutive interests should not wield
executive powers and that nonexecutive interests are already protected
by a robust and modern line of case law establishing both a duty of good-
faith pooling by the lessee and a duty of utmost good faith and fair deal-
ing.333 Recourse is available to nonexecutives if those duties are not met,
in addition to equitable remedies through implied covenants and possibly
through compulsory pooling.334
As things stand, not only can an NPRI owner choose whether a pooling
clause affects the interest, it can also seemingly choose what other terms
of the lease may apply to the interest. Further, it is likely the owner can
choose which NPRIs it owns in a leased tract or pool will ratify the lease
and which will not. To make matters more difficult for lessors and lessees,
express ratifications recorded in the official public records are not even
necessary to ratify leases; rather actions such as suing for royalties can
suffice.335
Allowing NPRIs to pool and conduct other executive actions leads to
negative practical effects. Large tracts burdened by NPRIs in places miles
from production will breed litigation sown by opportunistic ratification.
This will hinder production, as royalty calculations in areas with imprecise
title data will be expensive, time-consuming, and potentially inaccurate,
leading to still more litigation. With ratification now allowed by other
means besides a recorded notice, woe to the title examiner who must con-
330. See MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
331. See SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 12, at 138.
332. See Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. 1968).
333. See 6 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 227, § 925.1.
334. See Mineral Interest Pooling Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 102.001–102.112
(1977).
335. See Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 214.
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sider what actions by the NPRI owner may have tripped the ratification
switch and what terms of the lease were accepted. All this dampens in-
centives for development. Yes, the lessee can seek ratifications from all
NPRIs before development, but this costs time and money and may not
help in situations where the NPRIs are located far from production and
title is far from settled.
Finally, maybe the bottom hasn’t even been reached, and worse is to
come. Texas has not yet seen a case in which the lessors of a community
lease were paid on a spacing-unit basis, as provided for in the lease, while
a ratifying NPRI owner was paid on a lease-wide basis or a unit-wide
basis, as if the NPRI owner were in a unit even if no unit existed. How-
ever, such an injudicious result could occur in the case of large leases
burdened with relatively small NPRIs or other nonexecutive interests—
interests that are perhaps miles away from the productive spacing units.
This would put nonexecutive interests in an even better position than that
of the executives themselves. Recognizing the sensible limits on nonex-
ecutive rights proffered above would help prevent taking this misguided
last step.
